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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
Differing Agency Assessments of the Backfire Figure 11-30b
Estimated Characteristics b DIA/Army/Air Force CIA
Weights-kg (lb m)
Structural Weight 33,500 (73,800) 33,700 (74,270)
Operational Empty Weight 52,400 (115,500) 50,800 (112,000)
Fuel Weight, Bombing Mission 68,000 (150,000) 51,700 (114,000)
Payload Weight, Bombing Mission 9,400 (20,800) 4,500 (10,000)
Takeoff Gross Weight 130,900 (288,500) 107,000 (236,000)
Propulsion
Installed Intermediate Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea-Level Thrust-
kN (Ib r) 210 (47,000) 145 (32,500)
Cruise Specific Fuel Consumption (lb m/lb rhr) 0.93 1.04
CIA Optimized CIA Compromised
Aerodynamic Design c Aerodynamic Design
Aerodynamics
Cruise Lift-to-Drag Ratio 16.6 16.3 13.9
Cruise Speed-Mach 0.79 0.80 0.80
Mission Performance Unrefueled-nn
All-High, Bomber, Radius/Range 2,900/5,400 2,150/4,150 1,825/3,525
All-High, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range 2,600/4,500 1,650/2,900 1,400/2,425
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, Bomber, Radius/Ranger 2,450/4,950 1,750/3,750 1,450/3,125
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range r 2,200/4,000 1,275/2,525 1,050/2,100
200 nm Supersonic Dash, Bomber, Radius/Range s 1,750/3,950 950/3,050 825/2,600
Mission Performance Refueled-nm a
All-High, Bomber, Radius/Range 4,000/7,500 e 3,200/6,225 2,825/5,475
All-High, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range 3,750/6,450 2,800/4,950 2,500/4,350
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, Bomber, Radius/Range r 3,650/7,050 2,875/5,775 2,525/5,080
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range f 3,400/6,000 2,500/4,550 2,200/4,000
200 nm Supersonic Dash, Bomber, Radius/Range s 2,900/6,050 2,025/5,100 1,825/4,550
-This table gives assessments of performance for the Backfire as it is currently configured.
b According to one view, it is not possible with the evidence at hand to derive with confidence a single-figure capabilityfor the maximum
radius/range of the Backfire. The holders of this view are the Director,National Security Agency, and the Directorof Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy.
The longer range and radius values in the assessment of the Backfire by the Central Intelligence Agency are based on an assumed
aerodynamic design which is optimized for subsonic performance, while the shorter range and radius values are based on an assumed
compromised design. CIA has considered both designs because they represent reasonable upper and lower bounds of the Backfire's subsonic
cruise efficiency.
dThe uncertainties in these estimates of the Backfire's performance are as follows: CIA range ±300 nm, radius ±160nm; DIA/Army/Air
Force range +162 nm, -486 nm, radius +87 nm, -261 nm.
The radius/rangevalues of the DIA/Army/Air Force assessment, with a 4,500-kg (10,000-lb) payload, comparable to that used by the
CIA assessment, are 2,950/5,750 nrn unrefueled.
rThese radius/range values are for a high-altitude, optimum-cruise profile except for a 200-mn subsonic dash at sea level into the target
area. The radius value also includes a 200-nm subsonic dash for egress (400 rn total).
s The radius value includes 200 nm for ingress and 200 nm for egress at supersonic speed (400 nm total); the range value includes 200 run for
ingress only.
579031 an cu
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.