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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 20 …Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact does not have theater headquarters in being in peacetime, although hardened…
  • p. 21 …control of the Western and Southwestern TVD headquarters-often called High Commands by the Soviets. The…
  • p. 26 …links could be established to theater-level headquarters and to supporting strategic cornmands. Communications, between Moscow…
  • p. 35 …Surprise in the known: ' Soviet view can be achieved through many means- Administrative Structure HeadQuartered in…
  • p. 55 …The Soviets Headquarters in Moscow and are considered strategic maintain a total of 15 such divisions…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 74 …Readiness from Naval Headquarters in Moscow, from fleet Home Waters 40 Operable headquarters,.or by command…
  • p. 114 …reported to fleet headquarters, a practice we did not 259. Forward Basing. To support their worldwide…
  • p. 117 …Some do not have Ground Forces headquarters; some have d. Not all have naval commands. Military…
  • p. 118 …in Soviet maritime strategy is the MTVD, headquarters in being in peacetime. Hardened com- the Maritime…
  • p. 119 …The headquarters staffs and communications after full mobilization; a more typical front would support elements of…
  • p. 122 …Representatives of the Headquarters of the 14. The Soviets intend to maintain centralized con- Warsaw Pact…
  • p. 182 …The number of older ballistic missile subma- links could be established to theater-level headquarters rincs…
  • p. 183 …communications system for use between major fixed headquarters. 108. Logistic Support. Improvements in the logis- tic…
Differing Agency Assessments of the Backfire Figure 11-30b
Estimated Characteristics b DIA/Army/Air Force CIA
Weights-kg (lb m)
Structural Weight 33,500 (73,800) 33,700 (74,270)
Operational Empty Weight 52,400 (115,500) 50,800 (112,000)
Fuel Weight, Bombing Mission 68,000 (150,000) 51,700 (114,000)
Payload Weight, Bombing Mission 9,400 (20,800) 4,500 (10,000)
Takeoff Gross Weight 130,900 (288,500) 107,000 (236,000)
Propulsion
Installed Intermediate Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea-Level Thrust-
kN (Ib r) 210 (47,000) 145 (32,500)
Cruise Specific Fuel Consumption (lb m/lb rhr) 0.93 1.04
CIA Optimized CIA Compromised
Aerodynamic Design c Aerodynamic Design
Aerodynamics
Cruise Lift-to-Drag Ratio 16.6 16.3 13.9
Cruise Speed-Mach 0.79 0.80 0.80
Mission Performance Unrefueled-nn
All-High, Bomber, Radius/Range 2,900/5,400 2,150/4,150 1,825/3,525
All-High, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range 2,600/4,500 1,650/2,900 1,400/2,425
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, Bomber, Radius/Ranger 2,450/4,950 1,750/3,750 1,450/3,125
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range r 2,200/4,000 1,275/2,525 1,050/2,100
200 nm Supersonic Dash, Bomber, Radius/Range s 1,750/3,950 950/3,050 825/2,600
Mission Performance Refueled-nm a
All-High, Bomber, Radius/Range 4,000/7,500 e 3,200/6,225 2,825/5,475
All-High, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range 3,750/6,450 2,800/4,950 2,500/4,350
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, Bomber, Radius/Range r 3,650/7,050 2,875/5,775 2,525/5,080
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range f 3,400/6,000 2,500/4,550 2,200/4,000
200 nm Supersonic Dash, Bomber, Radius/Range s 2,900/6,050 2,025/5,100 1,825/4,550
-This table gives assessments of performance for the Backfire as it is currently configured.
b According to one view, it is not possible with the evidence at hand to derive with confidence a single-figure capabilityfor the maximum
radius/range of the Backfire. The holders of this view are the Director,National Security Agency, and the Directorof Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy.
The longer range and radius values in the assessment of the Backfire by the Central Intelligence Agency are based on an assumed
aerodynamic design which is optimized for subsonic performance, while the shorter range and radius values are based on an assumed
compromised design. CIA has considered both designs because they represent reasonable upper and lower bounds of the Backfire's subsonic
cruise efficiency.
dThe uncertainties in these estimates of the Backfire's performance are as follows: CIA range ±300 nm, radius ±160nm; DIA/Army/Air
Force range +162 nm, -486 nm, radius +87 nm, -261 nm.
The radius/rangevalues of the DIA/Army/Air Force assessment, with a 4,500-kg (10,000-lb) payload, comparable to that used by the
CIA assessment, are 2,950/5,750 nrn unrefueled.
rThese radius/range values are for a high-altitude, optimum-cruise profile except for a 200-mn subsonic dash at sea level into the target
area. The radius value also includes a 200-nm subsonic dash for egress (400 rn total).
s The radius value includes 200 nm for ingress and 200 nm for egress at supersonic speed (400 nm total); the range value includes 200 run for
ingress only.
579031 an cu
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.