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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 22 …Bell was still being developed.'' Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod- ify…
  • p. 55 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED E0129581.6(dlill>10<25Yrs ISI personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test…
  • p. 73 …On 3 August 1955, Dulles and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the…
  • p. 74 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (TS Codeword). " Brig. Gen. Leo…
  • p. 102 …U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr…
  • p. 107 …did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1, known within the Agency as Detachment…
  • p. 117 …Late on the evening of 3 July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building…
  • p. 127 …The PARAMOUNT Committee worked inside PID headquarters in the Steuart Building. Composed of members from CIA…
  • p. 138 …and prom tly reported the conversation to headquarters. When details of close call reached Washington, James…
  • p. 153 …of Detachment A achieved excellent results, project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe was not…
  • p. 194 …Because the new government had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to…
  • p. 205 …its own building to the new CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward, Col. Stanley W. Beerli…
  • p. 312 …that the performance of an A-12 with 175 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for…
  • p. 319 …12958 1.61111111>1010<25Yrs (Si Project Headquarters in Langley_planned and directed all operational BLACK…
  • p. 323 …Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense Secretary Vance on 10 January 1967 that the A- 12s would…
  • p. 324 …President Johnson con- firmed this decision on 21 May.'" - - Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968 as…
  • p. 334 …Air Force personnel served at all levels of the recon- naissance program, from project headquarters to…
  • p. 365 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (Top Secret Codeword). Interview with…
Secret
Chapter 2
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CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
the People's Republic of China. This project had its origins in a
RAND Corporation study from 1951. By the end of 1955, the Air
Force had overcome a number of technical problems in camera design
and recovery techniques and had manufactured a large number of bal-
loons for use in the project. President Eisenhower gave his approval
on 27 December 1955, and two weeks later the launches from bases
in Western Europe began. By the end of February 1956, the Air Force
had launched a total of 516 balloons.°
Project GENETRIX was much less successful than its sponsors
had hoped. Once launched, the balloons were at the mercy of the pre-
vailing winds, and many tended to drift toward southern Europe and
then across the Black Sea and the desert areas of China. These bal-
loons therefore missed the prime target areas, which lay in the higher
latitudes. Large numbers of balloons did not succeed in crossing the
Soviet Union and China, some because they were shot down by hos-
tile aircraft, others because they prematurely expended their ballast
supplies and descended too soon. Only 46 payloads were eventually
recovered (one more than a year later and the last not until 1958)
from the 516 balloons that had been launched. In four of these pay-
_loads the camera had malfunctioned, and in another eight the photog-
raphy was of no intelligence value. Thus, only 34 balloons succeeded
in obtaining useful photographs."
The low success rate of the Project GENETRIX balloons was not
the only problem encountered; far more serious was the storm of pro-
test and unfavorable publicity that the balloon overflights provoked.
Although the Air Force had issued a cover story that the balloons
were being used for weather research connected with the International
Geophysical Year, East European nations protested strongly to the
United States and to international aviation authorities, claiming that
the balloons endangered civilian aircraft. The Soviet Union sent
strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations
from which the balloons had been launched. The Soviets also col-
lected numerous polyethelene gasbags, camera payloads, and trans-
mitters from GENETRIX balloons and put them on display in
Moscow for the world press."
P. G. Strong. Attachment to Memorandum for DCI Dulles. -Project GENETRIX
Summary." 15 February 1956 (S).
Final Report, Project 119L. 1st Air Division (Meteorological Survey) Strategic Air
Command. 5 March 1956. D-582, General Summary (S. declassified 1979).
iVew York Times, 10 February 1956. p. It Omaha World Herald, II February 1956 p 1
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.