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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 91 …Early in the program Bissell and Ritland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation…
  • p. 95 …of their mission kept the level of cooperation high. The group always attempted to reach a…
  • p. 143 …deception project since its early days, he cooperated reluctantly because he disliked adding attachments that made…
  • p. 196 …as possible while giving the appearance of cooperating with his cap- tors. To extract the maximum…
  • p. 287 …by Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G) in cooperation with the Scientific Engineering Institute at a small…
  • p. 302 …Halaby cooperated fully with the Agency and personally briefed all FAA regional chiefs on how to…
  • p. 334 …The cooperation between the Agency and the Air Force that began with the U-2 and…
U-2 detachment in formation
E0129581.11(011>1010<25Yrs
IS)
Colonel Yancey's group carefully examined all aspects of the
U-2 unit from flight crews to camera technicians and mission pro-
grammers. When the exercise was over, Yancey reported that the de-
tachment was ready for deployment. 1-le then briefed a high-level
Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force and the
Chief of Air Staff. These officials concurred with Yancey's determi-
nation that the U-2 was ready for deployment."
During these final tests in the spring of 1956, the U-2 once again
demonstrated its unique airworthiness. On 14 April 1956, James
Cunningham was sitting in his office in Washington when he received
informing him that a westward-bound U-2 had
ut over the Mississippi River at the western bor-
der of Tennessee. After restarting his engine, the pilot reported a sec-
ond flameout and engine vibrations so violent that he was unable to
get the power plant to start again. Early in the program Bissell and
Ritland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation of
the Air Force, had arranged for sealed orders to be delivered to every
airbase in the continental United States giving instructions about what
to do if a U-2 needed to make an emergency landing.
Cunningham had the project office ask the pilot how far he could
glide so they could determine which SAC base should be alerted. The
pilot, who by this time was over Arkansas, radioed back that, given
the prevailing winds and the U-2's 21:1 glide ratio, he thought he
could reach Albuquerque. New Mexico. Within minutes Cunningham
was on the phone to Colonel Geary in the Pentagon, who then had the
Air Force's Assistant Director of Operations, Brig. Gen. Ralph E.
" Bissell interview CS); OSA History, chap. 11, pp. 15-16 (TS Codeword).
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.