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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
Chapter 2
75
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
28 November 1955. The CIA's insistence on more stringent physical
and mental examinations than those used by the Air Force to select
pilots for its U-2 fleet resulted in a higher rejection rate of candidates.
The Agency's selection criteria remained high throughout its manned
overflight program and resulted in a much lower accident rate for
CIA U-2 pilots than for their counterparts in the Air Force program.'2
PILOT TRAINING
Even before the recruiting effort got under way, the Air Force and
CIA be g an to develop a pilot training program. Under the terms of the
OILSTONE agreement between the Agency and the Air Force, re-
sponsibility for pilot training lay with SAC. This essential activity
was carried out under the supervision of Col. William F. Yancey, who
was assigned to March AFB and flew to I leach day.
Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAL pilots who were to be
trained by Lockheed test pilots to fly the U-2. Once they became
qualified, these SAC pilots would become the trainers for the
—.sheep-dipped" former Reserve SAC pilots, who would fly U-2 mis-
sions for the CIA.
The original U-2 test pilot, Tony LeVier, trained several other
Lockheed test pilots in the difficult art of flying the U-2. Eventually
there were enough trained Lockheed pilots available to test the air-
craft coming off the assembly line and also train the SAC pilots.
Training was difficult because there was no twa-seat model of the
U-2. All instruction had to be given on the ground before takeoff and
then over the radio once the craft was airborne. Almost 15 years
elapsed before a two-seat U-2 was available for training new pilots.
Despite the difficulties involved in training U-2 pilots, Colonel
Yancey had a cadre of six qualified Air Force U-2 pilots by
September 1955. These six were now ready to train the Agency's pi-
lots."
Training pilots was not easy because the U-2 was a mixture of
glider and jet. Although those chosen for the overflight program were
all qualified fighter pilots, they now had to learn to fly the delicate
U-2. Its large wings had tremendous lift but were also very fragile
ED 129511.8(0111>10<25Yrs
Is)
OS) History, chap, 10, pp. 5-6: chap. 5, p. 18 (TS Codeword).
" OSA History. chap. II. pp. 1-7 (TS Codeword).
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UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.