CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

-"gircr"11T141440,atj,
Chapter 2
71
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
LeVier made an additional 19 flights in article 341 before mov-
ing on to other Lockheed flight test programs in early September.
This first phase of U-2 testing explored the craft's stall envelope, took
the aircraft to its maximum stress limit (2.5 g's), and explored its
speed potential. LeVier soon flew the aircraft at its maximum speed
of Mach 0.85. Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti-
tudes never before attained in sustained flight. On 16 August LeVier
took the aircraft up to 52,000 feet. In preparation for this flight, the
42-year-old test pilot completed the Air Force partial-pressure suit
training program, becoming the oldest pilot to do so. Testing at even
higher altitudes continued, and on 8 September the U-2 reached its
initial design altitude of 65,600 feet.4'
On 22 September 1955, the U-2 experienced its first flameout at
64,000 feet—more than 12 miles up. After a brief restart, the .1571
P-37 engine again flamed out at 60,000 feet, and the aircraft
descended to 35,000 feet before the engine could be relit. Engineers
from Pratt & Whitney immediately set to work on this problem. The
P-37 model engine had significantly poorer combustion characteris-
tics than the preferred but unavailable P-31 version and therefore
tended to flame out at high altitudes. Combustion problems usually
became apparent as the U-2 began the final part of its climb from
57,000 to 65,000 feet, causing pilots to refer to this area as the "bad-
lands" or the "chimney." Flameouts bedeviled the U-2 project until
sufficient numbers of the more powerful P-31 engines became avail-
able in the spring of 1956.46
Meanwhile, with the airworthiness of the U-2 airframe proven,
Lockheed set up a production line in the Skunk Works, but delivery of
even the second-choice J57/P-37 engines became a major problem.
Pratt & Whitney's full production capacity for these engines for the
next year was contracted to the Air Force for use in F-100 fighters
and KC-135 tankers. Colonel Geary, with the help of a colleague in
the Air Force Materiel Command, managed to arrange the diversion
of a number of these engines from a shipment destined for Boeing's
KC-135 production line, making it possible to continue building the
U-2s.47
OSA Chronology, p. 7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22.
OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 12-14 (TS Cocleword).
Geary interview (S).
ret
UNCLASSIFIED