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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
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Chapter 2
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005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
followed on I August. LeVier accelerated to 70 knots and began to try
the ailerons. "It was at this point that I became aware of being air-
borne." LeVier noted afterward, -which left me with utter amaze-
ment, as I had no intentions whatsoever of flying. I immediately
started back toward the ground, but had difficulty determining my
height because the lakebed had no markings to judge distance or
height. I made contact with the ground in a left bank of approximately
10 degrees." The U-2 bounced back into the air, but LeVier was able
to bring it back down for a second landing. He then applied the brakes
with little effect, and the aircraft rolled for a long distance before
coming to a stop."
Bissell, Cunningham. and Johnson saw the aircraft fall and
bounce. Leaping into a jeep, they roared off toward the plane. They
signaled to LeVier to climb out and then used fire extinguishers to put
out a tire in the brakes. At a debriefing session that followed. LeVier
complained about the poor performance of the brakes and the absence
of markings on the runway. Damage to the prototype U-2 was very
minor: blown tires, a leaking oleostrut on the undercarriage, and dam-
aged brakes. This unplanned flight was but a foretaste of the airwor-
thiness of the U-2. New pilots all had difficulty in getting the U-2's
wheels on the ground because at low speeds it would remain in
ground effect and glide effortlessly above the runway for great dis-
tances.
Taxi trials continued for one more day and were followed by the
first planned flight on 4 August 1955. LeVier was again at the con-
trols and had been instructed by Kelly Johnson to land the U-2 by
making initial contact with the main or forward landing gear and let-
ting the plane settle back on the rear wheel. LeVier had disagreed
with this approach. believing that the U-2 would bounce if he tried to
touch down on the forward gear first. After flying the aircraft up to
8,000 feet, LeVier leveled off and began cycling the landing gear up
and down: then he tested the flaps and the plane's stability and control
systems. Finally. LeVier made his first landing approach. As the U-2
settled down, the forward landing gear touched the runway and the
plane skipped and bounced into the air. LeVier made a second attempt
to land front wheels first, and again the plane bounded into the air.
Transcripts of the test pilots and observers' comments on the initial U-2 test tlights
have been published in "Secret First Flight of Article 001," Spyp/anes vol. 2, 1988, pp.
64-71. 82-85.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.