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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 22 …Bell was still being developed.'' Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod- ify…
  • p. 55 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED E0129581.6(dlill>10<25Yrs ISI personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test…
  • p. 73 …On 3 August 1955, Dulles and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the…
  • p. 74 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (TS Codeword). " Brig. Gen. Leo…
  • p. 102 …U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr…
  • p. 107 …did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1, known within the Agency as Detachment…
  • p. 117 …Late on the evening of 3 July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building…
  • p. 127 …The PARAMOUNT Committee worked inside PID headquarters in the Steuart Building. Composed of members from CIA…
  • p. 138 …and prom tly reported the conversation to headquarters. When details of close call reached Washington, James…
  • p. 153 …of Detachment A achieved excellent results, project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe was not…
  • p. 194 …Because the new government had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to…
  • p. 205 …its own building to the new CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward, Col. Stanley W. Beerli…
  • p. 312 …that the performance of an A-12 with 175 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for…
  • p. 319 …12958 1.61111111>1010<25Yrs (Si Project Headquarters in Langley_planned and directed all operational BLACK…
  • p. 323 …Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense Secretary Vance on 10 January 1967 that the A- 12s would…
  • p. 324 …President Johnson con- firmed this decision on 21 May.'" - - Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968 as…
  • p. 334 …Air Force personnel served at all levels of the recon- naissance program, from project headquarters to…
  • p. 365 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (Top Secret Codeword). Interview with…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
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Chapter 2
60
devices had to be calibrated to 80,000 feet. This immediately raised
eyebrows at Kollman because its instruments only went to 45,000
feet. Agency security personnel quickly briefed several Kollman offi-
cials and produced a cover story that the altimeters were to be used on
experimental rocket planes."'
THE CIA – AIR FORCE PARTNERSHIP
At the initial interagency meetings to establish the U-2 program in
December 1954, the participants did not work out a clear delineation
of responsibilities between the CIA and the Air Force. They agreed
only that the Air Force would supply the engines and the Agency
would pay for the airframes and cameras. With a myriad of details still
unsettled, CIA and Air Force representatives began to work on an
interagency agreement that would assign specific responsibilities for
the program. These negotiations proved difficult. Discussions on this
subject between DCI Allen Dulles and Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan
Twining began in March 1955. Twining wanted SAC, headed by Gen.
Curtis E. LeMay, to run the project once the planes and pilots were
ready to fly, but Dulles opposed such an arrangement. The CIA-USAF
talks dragged on for several months, with Twining determined that
SAC should have full control once the aircraft was deployed.
Eventually President Eisenhower settled the dispute. "I want this
whole thing to be a civilian operation," the President wrote. "If uni-
formed personnel of the armed services of the United States fly over
Russia, it is an act of war—legally—and I don't want any part of it." 2$
With the issue of control over the program settled, the two agen-
cies soon worked out the remaining details. On 3 August 1955, Dulles
and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the basic
agreement, titled "Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities—
Project OILSTONE" (OILSTONE was the Air Force codenarne for the
project). This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection
and training, weather information, mission plotting, and operational
support. The Agency was responsible for cameras, security, contract-
ing, film processing, and arrangements for foreign bases, and it also
had a voice in the selection of pilots. All aeronautical aspects of the
Ibid.
OSA History, chap. 3, pp. 8-15 (TS Codeword): Beschloss, Mayday, pp. 105-107.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.