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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
Chapter 2
44
E0 12958 1.6([11111>1010<25Yrs
IS] _
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
use. Public Law 110, approved by the 81st Congress on 20 June 1949,
designates the Director of Central Intelligence as the only government
employee who can obligate Federal money without the use of vouch-
ers.1
In mid-December 1954, President Eisenhower authorized DCI
Dulles to use rom the Agency's Contingency Reserve Fund
to finance the -.. project. Then on 22 December 1954, the Agency
signed a letter contract with Lockheed, using the codename Project
OARFISH. The Agency had proposed to give Lockheed "performance
specifications" rather than the standard Air Force "technical specifica-
tions," which were more rigid and demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed
that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed's original pro-
posal to the Air Force in May 1954 had been 'or 20 U-2s
equipped with GE J73 engines. During negotiations with CIA General
Lawrence R. Houston, Lockheed changed its proposal to
for 20 airframes plus a two-seat trainer model and spares; the
as to furnish the engines. Houston insisted that the Agency could
only budget
of the availa e
sides finally agr
or the airframes because it needed the balance
for cameras and life-support gear. The two
d-price contract with a provision for a re-
view three-fourths of the way through to determine if the costs were
going to exceed the rgure. The formal contract, No.
SP-1913, was signed on 2 March 19 and called for the delivery of the
first U-2 in July 1955 and the last in November 1956. Meanwhile, to
keep work moving at Lockheed, Richard Bissell wrote a check
and mailed it to Kelly Johns
home on 21 February 1955."
4 John S. Warner, Office of the General Counsel, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach,
Washington, DC, tape recording, 5 Aug 1983 (S); OSA History, chap. 5, pp. 1-2 and annex
42 (TS Codeword); Johnson, "Log for Project X." 21 February 1955.
`Sec<
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.