Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
“The Advance”26 pages
--Seertiht..114Q Chapter 1 37 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED President and received verbal authorization to proceed. Eisenhower told Dulles that the project was to be managed by the Agency and that the Air Force was to provide any assistance needed to get it operational.66 Thus, it was that the CIA entered into the world of high technol- ogy primarily because of decisions and actions taken outside the Agency: the Air Force's refusal to build the CL-282 aircraft, President Eisenhower's desire to have a sensitive overflight project conducted by a civilian agency rather than the military, and, above all, the determination by a small group of prominent scientists that the Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais- sance system.' Charles Pearre Cabe11, Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting at the White House." 24 November 1954. in OSA History, chap. 2, annex 8 (TS Codeword) ; Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 82-83: Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference with the President, 24 November 1954," White House Office of the Staff Secretary, Alpha Series. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter cited as WHOSS. Alpha, DDEL) (TS. declassified). Scientists remained active in advising the government on overhead reconnaissance. In February 1955, the Technological Capabilities Panel issued its final report, which strongly urged the use of technology to gather intelligence. President Eisenhower strongly backed the panel's findings and directed government agencies to respond to the recommendations by June. The CIA's most important reaction to the Technological Capabilities Panel report was to create its own Scientific Advisory Board composed of the members of the Project Three Study Group with the addition of James Killian and Jerome B. Wiesner. professor of electrical engineering at MIT. Edwin Land served as chairman of the CIA Scientific Advisory Board for the next 10 years, and it soon became known unofficially as the Land Panel. This panel provided important advice to the Agency. particularly in the field of over- head reconnaissance. President Eisenhower also acted to increase the amount and quality of scientific advice he was receiving. In January 1956 he established the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (renamed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1961) to oversee the intelligence community and advise him on intelligence mat- ters. The board's first chairman was James Killian. In 1957 the President reorganized and upgraded the Office of Defense Mobilization's Science Advisory Committee, which be- came the President's Science Advisory Committee. He also named James Killian to be the first Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. In this new position Killian served as the President's scientific advisor and the chairman of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee (Killian stepped down as chairman of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities but remained a member). These actions by the President brought scientists into the White House and gave them considerable influence UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.