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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 1
36
ED 1295131.61dlill>10<25Yrs
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On 19 November, the day after Seaberg's briefing, the final deci-
sion on the CL-282 came at a luncheon hosted by Air Force Secretary
Talbott. The participants—Dulles and Cabell from the CIA; Gardner,
Ayer, and General Putt from the Air Force; Kelly Johnson; and Edwin
Land—all agreed "that the special item of material described by
Lockheed was practical and desirable and would be sought.. . . It was
agreed that the Project should be a joint Air Force–CIA one but that,
regardless of the source of the funds, whether AF or CIA, \
It is interesting to note that Lockheed, which had originally de-
veloped the CL-282 on its own and had devoted considerable effort to
promoting it, had to be persuaded to undertake the project in
November 1954 because the company had become heavily committed
to several other civilian and military projects. When Kelly Johnson
received a call from Trevor Gardner on 17 November asking him to
come to Washington for conversations on the project, his instructions
from Lockheed's senior management were "to not commit to any
program during the visit, but to get the information and return."
When he returned to California, Johnson noted in his project log that
"I was impressed with the secrecy aspect and was told by Gardner
that I was essentially being drafted for the project. It seemed, in fact,
that if I did not talk quietly, I might have to take a leave of absence
from my job at Lockheed to do this special project." 65 Of course,
Kelly Johnson did not need to be drafted or persuaded into undertak-
ing such a bold step forward in aircraft design. He used Gardner's
statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the
project, which they did after meeting with Johnson when he returned
to California on the evening of 19 November.
Four days later, on 23 November, the Intelligence Advisory
Committee (IAC) approved DCI Dulles's request to undertake the
CL-282 project. The following day Dulles signed a three-page mem-
orandum, drafted by DDCI Cabell, asking President Eisenhower to
approve the overhead reconnaissance project. That same afternoon, at
a meeting attended by the Secretaries of State and Defense and senior
Air Force officials, Dulles and Cabell presented the document to the
Charles Pearre Cabell, Memorandum for the Record. "Luncheon Meeting with the
Secretary of the Air Force," 19 November 1954, in OSA History. chap. 2, annex 4 (TS
Codeword).
" Johnson, "Log for Project X," 17 and 19 November 1954.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.