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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 1
32
camera with tremendously improved resolution and film capacity, and
the Eastman Kodak company was working on new thin, lightweight
film."
By October 1954, the Project Three study group had drafted a
complete program for an overhead reconnaissance effort based on the
CL-282 aircraft. The one remaining question was who would conduct
the overflights. The committee's members, particularly Land, were
not in favor of the Air Force conducting such missions in peacetime.
Firmly believing that military overflights in armed aircraft could pro-
voke a war, they argued for civilian overflights in unarmed, unmarked
aircraft. In their view, the organization most suited for this mission
was the Central Intelligence Agency.6
In late October 1954, the Project Three panel discussed the
CL-282 system concept with DCI Allen Dulles and the Secretary of
the Air Force's Special Assistant for Research and Development,
Trevor Gardner. Dulles was reluctant to have the CIA undertake the
project. He did not like to involve the CIA with military projects, even
ones that the military had rejected, like the CL-282. Furthermore. the
DCI strongly believed that the Agency's mission lay in the use of hu-
man operatives and secret communications, the classic forms of intel-
ligence gathering. Land came away from this meeting with the
impression that Dulles somehow thought overflights were not fair
play. Project Three committee members were nevertheless convinced
that technology, particularly in the form of the CL-282 and the new
camera designs, would solve the nation's intelligence problems."
A Meeting With the President
Allen Dulles's reluctance to involve the CIA in the CL-282 project did
not stop the Project Three committee from pursuing its aims because it
was able to go over Dulles's head and appeal directly to the President.
Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence
Systems Panel, several Project Three members had definite ideas on
how to improve intelligence collection, ideas that they were deter-
mined to present to the highest levels of government. They were able
" Land interview (TS Codeword).
Land interview (TS Codeword): Baker interview (S).
" Land interview (TS Cotieword).
SJiret
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.