Documents / FOIA release

CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
Edwin H. Land
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
29
the task of investigating the nation's intelligence capabilities. Its
chairman was Edwin H. (Din) Land, the inventor of the polarizing fil-
ter and the instant camera. When James Killian asked Land to head
Project Three, Land had to make a major decision about his career. At
the time, the 45-year-old millionaire was on a leave of absence from
Polaroid and was living in Hollywood, advising Alfred Hitchcock on
the technological aspects of making three-dimensional movies. Land
decided to give up his interest in cinema's third dimension and return
east to Polaroid and the panel appointment.47
Land's Project Three was the smallest of the three Technological
Capabilities Panel projects, for he preferred what he called "taxicab
committees"—committees small enough to fit into a single taxicab.
The Project Three committee consisted of Land; James Baker and
Edward Purcell of Harvard; chemist Joseph W. Kennedy of
Washington University, St. Louis; mathematician John W. Tukey of
Princeton University and Bell Telephone Laboratories; and Allen
Latham, Jr., of Arthur D. Little, Inc., an engineer and former treasurer
of the Polaroid Corporation."
-
In mid-August 1954. Land and Baker went to Washington to ar-
range for the various intelligence organizations to brief the Project
Three study group. As the briefings progressed, the panel members
became more and more distressed at the poor state of the nation's in-
telligence resources. Land later noted, "We would go in and interview
generals and admirals in charge of intelligence and come away wor-
ried. Here we were, five or six young men, asking questions that these
high-ranking officers couldn't answer." Land added that the Project
Three members were also not overly impressed with the Central
Intelligence Agency.49
Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft
soon after he arrived in Washington. Philip Strong showed him Kelly
Johnson's conceptual drawing of the plane and told him that the Air
Force had rejected it. Although Land had heard Allen Donovan
James R. Killian, Jr., interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, tape recording. Cambridge.
Massachusetts, 2 November 1984 (S); Land interview (TS Codeword).
" TCP Report. p. 188 (S).
Land interview (TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.