Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
“The Pentagon”9 pages
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Chapter 1 26 wingroot areas to withstand the high speeds and sharp turns man- dated by the standard military airworthiness rules added too much weight to the airframe, thereby negating the efficiency of the sail- plane wing. In short, it was possible to achieve altitudes in excess of 70, 000 feet, but only by making certain that all parts of the aeronautical equation were in balance: thrust, lift, and weight. The only plane meeting these requirements, Donovan insisted, was Kelly Johnson's CL-282 because it was essentially a sailplane. In Donovan's view, the CL-282 did not have to meet the specifications of a combat aircraft because it could fly safely above Soviet fighters:" Donovan's arguments convinced the Intelligence Systems Panel of the merits of the CL-282 proposal, but this panel reported to the Air Force, which had already rejected the CL-282. Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by September 1954—the members of the Intelligence Systems Panel and high-ranking Air Force civilians such as Trevor Gardner—these back- ers were all connected with the Air Force. They could not offer funds to Lockheed to pursue the CL-282 concept because the Air Force was already committed to the Martin RB-57 and the Bell X-16. Additional support from outside the Air Force was needed to bring the CL-282 project to life, and this support would come from scientists serving on high-level advisory committees. The Technological Capabilities Panel The Eisenhower administration was growing increasingly concerned over the capability of the Soviet Union to launch a surprise attack on the United States. Early in 1954, Trevor Gardner had become alarmed by a RAND Corporation study warning that a Soviet surprise attack might destroy 85 percent of the SAC bomber force. Gardner then met with Dr. Lee DuBridge, President of the California Institute of Technology and Chairman of the Office of Defense Mobilization's Science Advisory Committee, and criticized the committee for not dealing with such essential problems as the possibility of a surprise attack. This criticism led DuBridge to invite Gardner to speak at the Science Advisory Committee's next meeting. After listening to " Donovan interview (S); Baker interview (S). ret UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.