Documents / FOIA release

CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 24 …Advanced Development Projects Division, Burbank. California. ED 129581.131011>10<25Yrs IS1 UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 58 …Pedlow, Burbank, California, 26 August 1988. Sbc.et UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Iwithout arousing a great deal of curiosity. The…
  • p. 273 …SP-1362, "History of the OXCART Program," Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. 1 July 1968, p…
  • p. 287 …designed trailer truck that carried it from Burbank By 18 November 1959, the mockup was in…
  • p. 297 …Construction began in September 1960; a C-47 shuttle service ferried work crews from Burbank to…
  • p. 299 …The plane left Burbank on 26 February 1962 and arrived at two days later. After the…
  • p. 304 …into the engine nacelles during assembly at Burbank were sucked into the power plant during initial…
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Chapter 1
25
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
CL-282 design was essentially a jet-propelled glider capable of attain-
ing the altitudes that he felt were necessary to carry out reconnais-
sance of the Soviet Union successfully:"
Upon his return east on 8 August, Donovan got in touch with
James Baker and suggested an urgent meeting of the Intelligence
Systems Panel. Because of other commitments by the members, how-
ever, the panel did not meet to hear Donovan's report until 24
September 1954 at the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory. Several
members, including Land and Strong, were absent. Those who did at-
tend were upset to learn that the Air Force had funded a closed com-
petition for a tactical reconnaissance plane without informing them.
But once Donovan began describing Kelly Johnson's rejected design
for a jet-powered glider, they quickly forgot their annoyance and lis-
tened intently.
Donovan began by stressing that high-altitude reconnaissance
aircraft had to fly above 70,000 feet to be safe from interception.
Next, he set out what he considered to be the three essential re-
quirements for a high-altitude spyplane: a single engine, a sailplane
wing, and low structural load factors. Donovan strongly favored
single-engine aircraft because they are both lighter and more reli-
able than multiengine aircraft. Although a twin-engine aircraft could
theoretically return to base on only one engine, Donovan explained,
it could only do so at a much lower altitude, about 34,000 feet,
where it was sure to be shot down.
The second of Donovan's essential factors, a sailplane wing (in
technical terms a high-aspect-ratio, low-induced-drag wing), was
needed to take maximum advantage of the reduced thrust of a jet en-
gine operating in the rarefied atmosphere of extreme altitude. Because
of the thinness of the atmosphere above 70,000 feet, engineers esti-
mated that the power curve of a jet engine would fall off to about 6
percent of its sea-level thrust.
Finally, low structural load factors, like those used by transport
aircraft, were necessary to reduce weight and thereby achieve maxi-
mum altitude. Donovan explained that strengthening wings and
Donovan interview (S)
ret
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.