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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 24 …Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib…
  • p. 25 …a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design."' Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's…
  • p. 26 …interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona del Mar. California. 20 May 1985 (S). Johnson, "Log for…
  • p. 27 …Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong…
  • p. 30 …To make Kelly Johnson's revolutionary design a reality, one additional source of support was necessary…
  • p. 42 …When James Killian asked Land to head Project Three, Land had to make a major decision…
  • p. 48 …do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, 1 overlaid a curve showing that with…
  • p. 57 …demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed…
  • p. 58 …a week after he had been authorized to begin the project, Kelly Johnson wrote a 23…
  • p. 69 …project staff) flew LIZ with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by eed's…
  • p. 72 …This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to…
  • p. 79 …Batlin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermann Goering, a thin glass ampule containing…
  • p. 81 …Kelly Johnson used a "wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was…
  • p. 89 …Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle…
  • p. 162 …By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests…
  • p. 276 RN Chapter 6 263 Johnson, "Archangel log," 17-24 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Lockheed design for a hydrogen…
  • p. 324 …OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep…
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Chapter 7
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involvement in Indochina, U-2 photo g raphy provided accurate and
up-to-date intelligence to US policymakers and field commanders, as-
sisting them in crisis management and the planning of military opera-
tions. Agency U-2s also assisted in monitorin g cease-fire agreements
in the Middle East, with operations occurring after an undeclared war
in 1970 and the 1973 Middle East war.
By the time the OXCART became fully operational, manned
strategic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union was no longer seriously
considered. The political risks were too high. especially since the
quality of intelligence from reconnaissance satellites was increasing
steadily. Thus, the OXCART's only operational use was for collecting
tactical intelligence in the Far East. Like the U-2, the OXCART g ath-
ered valuable intelligence during crisis situations. Thus, in January
1968, OXCART photography revealed the location of the USS Pueblo
and showed that the North Koreans were not preparing any
large-scale military activity in conjunction with the ship's seizure.
ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY
One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance
program was the many advances in technology that it generated.
Thanks to simplified covert procurement arran gements and the lack
of detailed and restricting specifications, creative desi g ners such as
Kelly Johnson produced state-of-the-art aircraft in record time. The
U-2. desi g ned to carry out reconnaissance missions for two years at
best, proved so successful that, even after its original area of activity
became too dangerous for overfli g hts at the end of four years, the air-
craft served the CIA well for another 14 years and still is in service
with other government agencies.
The OXCART is an even better example of the technological ad-
vances generated by the CIA's reconnaissance program. Although the
OXCART was designed almost 30 years ago and first flown in 1962.
its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of
this aircraft also led to the use of new materials in aircraft construc-
tion. Unfortunately. the technolo g ical breakthroughs that made the
OXCART possible took longer than expected. By the time the aircraft
was ready for operations, the missions originally planned for it were
not practicable. The tremendous technological achievement repre-
sented by the OXCART ultimately led to the aircraft's demise by in-
spiring the Air Force to purchase its own version of the aircraft. The
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.