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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 22 …Bell was still being developed.'' Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod- ify…
  • p. 55 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED E0129581.6(dlill>10<25Yrs ISI personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test…
  • p. 73 …On 3 August 1955, Dulles and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the…
  • p. 74 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (TS Codeword). " Brig. Gen. Leo…
  • p. 102 …U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr…
  • p. 107 …did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1, known within the Agency as Detachment…
  • p. 117 …Late on the evening of 3 July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building…
  • p. 127 …The PARAMOUNT Committee worked inside PID headquarters in the Steuart Building. Composed of members from CIA…
  • p. 138 …and prom tly reported the conversation to headquarters. When details of close call reached Washington, James…
  • p. 153 …of Detachment A achieved excellent results, project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe was not…
  • p. 194 …Because the new government had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to…
  • p. 205 …its own building to the new CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward, Col. Stanley W. Beerli…
  • p. 312 …that the performance of an A-12 with 175 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for…
  • p. 319 …12958 1.61111111>1010<25Yrs (Si Project Headquarters in Langley_planned and directed all operational BLACK…
  • p. 323 …Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense Secretary Vance on 10 January 1967 that the A- 12s would…
  • p. 324 …President Johnson con- firmed this decision on 21 May.'" - - Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968 as…
  • p. 334 …Air Force personnel served at all levels of the recon- naissance program, from project headquarters to…
  • p. 365 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (Top Secret Codeword). Interview with…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 7
315
U-2 OVERFLIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION
Before the first U-2 overflights in the summer of 1956, project man-
agers believed that their aircraft could fly virtually undetected over
the Soviet Union. They did not expect this advantage to last very
long, however, because they also expected the Soviets to develop ef-
fective countermeasures against the U-2 within 12 to 18 rrionths.
Recognizing that time was against them, the U-2 project managers
planned a large number of missions to obtain complete coverage of
the Soviet Union as quickly as possible. At this time, the U-2 program
focused solely on the collection of strategic intelligence.
Once operations began, however, project managers found them-
selves operating under severe constraints. Contrary to the CIA's ex-
pectations, the U-2 could not fly undetected. Its overflights led to
Soviet diplomatic protests and numerous attempts at interception. Not
wishing to aggravate the Soviet Union during periods of tension or to
harm relations during more favorable intervals, President Eisenhower
placed strict limits on overflights, personally authorizing each one
and greatly limiting their number. Yet, the President never went so far
as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chief, he
valued the intelligence that the U-2 overflights collected, especially at
times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was
falling behind the Soviet Union militarily, first in bombers and then in
missiles. As a result of the President's ambivalence toward over-
flights, the years 1956-60 were marked by long periods during which
no overflights occurred, followed by brief bursts of activity.
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UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.