Documents / FOIA release

CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
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Chapter 6
313
SUMMARY OF THE OXCART PROGRAM
Intended to replace the U-2 as a collector of strategic intelligence, the
OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was
strictly for obtaining tactical intelligence and its photographic product
contributed very little to the Agency's strategic intelligence mission.
By the time OXCART became operational, photosatellite systems had
tilled the role originally conceived for it. The most advanced aircraft
of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever
used operationally.'"
The OXCART did not even outlast the U-2, the aircraft it was
supposed to replace. The OXCART lacked the quick-response capa-
bility of the smaller craft: a U-2 unit could be activated overnight, and
within a week it could deploy abroad, fly sorties, and return to home
base. The OXCART planes required precise logistic planning for fuel
and emergency landing fields, and their inertial guidance systems
needed several days for programming and stabilization. Aerial tankers
had to be deployed in advance alone an OXCART's flight route and
be provisioned with the highly specialized fuel used by the 158 en-
gines. All of this required a great deal of time and the effort -of several
hundred people. A U-2 mission could be planned and flown with a
third fewer personnel.
Although the OXCART program created a strategic reconnais-
sance aircraft with unprecedented speed. range. and altitude, the pro-
gram's most important contributions lay in other areas: aerodynamic
design, high-impact plastics, engine performance, cameras, electronic
countermeasures, pilot life-support systems, antiradar devices, use of
nonmetallic materials for major aircraft assemblies, and improve-
ments in milling, machining, and shaping titanium. In all of these ar-
eas, the OXCART pushed back the frontiers of aerospace technology
and helped lay the foundation for future "stealth - research.
On 26 January 1967 Kelly Johnson noted in his "Archanizel
I think back to 1959. bePre we started this airplane, to discussions with Dick Bissell
where we seriously considered the problem of whether there would be one more round of
aircraft behre the satellites took over. We jointly agreed there would be just one round.
and not two. That seems to have been a very accurate evaluation, as it seems that 30
SR-71s give us enough overflight reconnaissance capability and we don't need the addi-
tional 10 Oxcart aircraft.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.