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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 24 …Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib…
  • p. 25 …a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design."' Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's…
  • p. 26 …interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona del Mar. California. 20 May 1985 (S). Johnson, "Log for…
  • p. 27 …Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong…
  • p. 30 …To make Kelly Johnson's revolutionary design a reality, one additional source of support was necessary…
  • p. 42 …When James Killian asked Land to head Project Three, Land had to make a major decision…
  • p. 48 …do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, 1 overlaid a curve showing that with…
  • p. 57 …demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed…
  • p. 58 …a week after he had been authorized to begin the project, Kelly Johnson wrote a 23…
  • p. 69 …project staff) flew LIZ with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by eed's…
  • p. 72 …This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to…
  • p. 79 …Batlin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermann Goering, a thin glass ampule containing…
  • p. 81 …Kelly Johnson used a "wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was…
  • p. 89 …Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle…
  • p. 162 …By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests…
  • p. 276 RN Chapter 6 263 Johnson, "Archangel log," 17-24 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Lockheed design for a hydrogen…
  • p. 324 …OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep…
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POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS TO THE OXCART
The OXCART was the last high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft pro-
duced for the CIA, although the Office of Special Activities did
briefly consider several possible successors to the OXCART during
the mid-1960s. The first of these, known as Project ISINGLASS, was
prepared by General Dynamics to utilize technology developed for its
Convair Division's earlier FISH proposal and its new F-11 l fighter in
order to create an aircraft capable of Mach 4-5 at 100,000 feet.
General Dynamics completed its feasibility study in the fall of 1964,
and OSA took no further action because the proposed aircraft would
still be vulnerable to existing Soviet countermeasures. In 1965 a more
ambitious design from McDonnell Aircraft came under consideration
as Project RHEINBERRY (although some of the work seems to have
come under the ISINGLASS desi g nation as well). This proposal fea-
tured a rocket-powered aircraft that would be launched from a B-52
mother ship and ultimately reach speeds as high as Mach 20 and alti-
tudes of up to 200,000 feet. Because buildin g this aircraft would have
involved tremendous technical challen ges and correspondingly high
costs, the Agency was not willing to embark on such a program at a
time when the main emphasis in overhead reconnaissance had shifted
from aircraft to satellites. As a result. when the OXCART program
ended in the summer of 1968, no more advanced successor was wait-
ing in the wings—only the veteran U-2.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.