Documents / FOIA release

CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 91 …Early in the program Bissell and Ritland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation…
  • p. 95 …of their mission kept the level of cooperation high. The group always attempted to reach a…
  • p. 143 …deception project since its early days, he cooperated reluctantly because he disliked adding attachments that made…
  • p. 196 …as possible while giving the appearance of cooperating with his cap- tors. To extract the maximum…
  • p. 287 …by Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G) in cooperation with the Scientific Engineering Institute at a small…
  • p. 302 …Halaby cooperated fully with the Agency and personally briefed all FAA regional chiefs on how to…
  • p. 334 …The cooperation between the Agency and the Air Force that began with the U-2 and…
refNQEOORN
Chapter 6
308
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
USS Pueblo in Wonsan Harbor
advanced aircraft ever built was to be put out to pasture. The aban-
donment of the OXCART did not result from any shortcomings of the
aircraft; the causes lay in fiscal pressures and competition between
the reconnaissance programs of the CIA and the Air Force.
Throughout the OXCART program, the Air Force had been ex-
ceedingly helpful; it gave financial support, conducted the refueling
program, provided operational facilities at Kadena, and airlifted
OXCART personnel and supplies to Okinawa for the Vietnam and
Korean operations. Air Force orders for variants of the CIA's A-12—
the YF-12A interceptor and the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft—had
helped lower development and procurement costs for the OXCART.
Nevertheless, once the Air Force had built up its own fleet of recon-
naissance aircraft, bud getary experts began to criticize the existence
of two expensive fleets of similar aircraft.
In November 1965, the very month that the A-I2 had been de-
clared operational, the Bureau of the Budget circulated a memoran-
dum that expressed concern about the costs of the A-12 and SR-71
programs. It questioned both the total number of planes required for
the combined fleets, and the necessity for a separate CIA fleet. The
memorandum recommended phasing out the A-12 program by
September 1966 and stopping any further procurement of the SR-71
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.