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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Sec OFORN
Chapte
303
Soviet missile system. As early as 1962, the intelligence community
began to be concerned about the actual purpose of new missile instal-
lations that first appeared near Tallinn, Estonia, and soon spread along
the northwestern quadrant of the Soviet Union. Attempts to photo-
graph the sites using reconnaissance satellites had been frustrated by
the prevailing cloud cover in the region. Because of the lack of accu-
rate information about the missile sites, there was a wide divergence
of views within the intelligence community about their purpose.
These views ranged from the CIA's belief that the installations con-
tained long-ran ge, surface-to-air missiles designed to counter strate-
gic bombers, to the Air Force's contention that Tallinn sites
represented a deployed antiballistic missile system.
Photointerpreters insisted that imagery with a resolution of 12 to
18 inches was necessary to determine missile size, antenna pattern,
and configuration of the engagement radars associated with the sys-
tem. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) analysts also needed data about
the Tallinn radars, but there were no collection sites that could moni-
tor the Tallinn emanations when the radars were being tested.
Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and
locktin modes, a fact that prevented analysts from knowing the fre-
quencies or any other performance characteristics of the radar.
To settle the question of the purpose of the Tallinn installations,
Office of Special Activities planners proposed a mission that would
use the high resolution of the OXCART's camera
This project's un-
classified name was Project SLOPE, LOCAL; its classified title was
Operation UPWIND.
The proposed project involved launching an A-12 OXCART air-
craft from find flying it to a Baltic Sea rendezvous
with a Project IDEALIST U-2 flying from an RAF facility in Great
Britain. The OXCART would fly north of Norway and then turn south
along the Soviet-Finnish border. Shortly before Leningrad, the A-12
would head west-southwest down the Baltic Sea, skirting the coasts of
Estonia. Latvia, Lithuania, Poland. and East Germany before heading
west to return to The entire flight would cover 11,000 nauti-
cal miles, take eight hours and 38 minutes, and require four aerial re-
fuelings.
EO 129581.6[111111>1010<25Yrs
Although the A- 12 would not violate Soviet airspace during this
dash, it would appear to Soviet radar network operators to be headed
for an overflight penetration in the vicinity of Leningrad. It was
ret
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.