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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 24 …Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib…
  • p. 25 …a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design."' Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's…
  • p. 26 …interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona del Mar. California. 20 May 1985 (S). Johnson, "Log for…
  • p. 27 …Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong…
  • p. 30 …To make Kelly Johnson's revolutionary design a reality, one additional source of support was necessary…
  • p. 42 …When James Killian asked Land to head Project Three, Land had to make a major decision…
  • p. 48 …do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, 1 overlaid a curve showing that with…
  • p. 57 …demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed…
  • p. 58 …a week after he had been authorized to begin the project, Kelly Johnson wrote a 23…
  • p. 69 …project staff) flew LIZ with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by eed's…
  • p. 72 …This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to…
  • p. 79 …Batlin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermann Goering, a thin glass ampule containing…
  • p. 81 …Kelly Johnson used a "wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was…
  • p. 89 …Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle…
  • p. 162 …By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests…
  • p. 276 RN Chapter 6 263 Johnson, "Archangel log," 17-24 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Lockheed design for a hydrogen…
  • p. 324 …OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep…
"OXCART Story," p. 24 (S).
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
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sufficient support. The JCS and the PFIAB supported the CIA's advo-
cacy of OXCART deployment. Top State and Defense Department of-
ficials, however, thought that the political risks of basing the aircraft
in Okinawa—which would almost certainly disclose it to the
Japanese—outweighed any gains from the intelligence the OXCART
might gather. On 12 August 1966, the divergent views were presented
to President Johnson, who upheld the 303 Committee's majority opin-
ion against deployment for the time being."
The CIA then proposed an OXCART overflight of Cuba in order
to test the aircraft's ECM systems in a hostile environment. On 15
September the 303 Committee considered and rejected this idea on
the grounds that sending OXCART over Cuba "would disturb the ex-
isting calm prevailing in that area of our foreign affairs." 37
With operational missions still ruled out, proficiency training re-
mained the main order of business. This led to improvements in mis-
sion plans and flight tactics that enabled the detachment to reduce the
time required to deploy to Okinawa from 21 days to 15. Records con-
tinued to fall to the OXCART. On 21 December 1966, a Lockheed
test pilot flew an A-12 for 16,408 kilometers over the continental
United States in slightly more than six hours, for an average speed of
2.670 kilometers per hour (which included in-flight refueling at
speeds as low as 970 kilometers per hour). This flight set a record for
speed and distance unapproachable by any other aircraft."
Two weeks later, on 5 January 1967, an A-12 crashed after a fuel
gauge malfunctioned and the aircraft ran out of fuel short of the run-
way. Pilot Walter Ray ejected but was killed when he could not
become separated from the ejection seat. To preserve the secrecy of
the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an
SR-71 was missing and presumed downis loss, like the
three preceding crashes, did not result rom iculties caused by
high-speed, high-temperature flight but from traditional problems in-
herent in any new aircraft.
Proposals for OXCART operations continued to surface, and in
May 1967 the CIA forwarded a detailed request to the 303 Committee
to use the OXCART to collect strategic intelligence about a new
'"OXCART Story. •• p. 23 (S): OSA History, chap. 20. pp. 110-111 (TSo
ewor .
OSA History, chap. 20, p. 112 (TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

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About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.