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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 6 …Project OXCART, 1956-1968 The Evaluation of Designs for a Successor to the U-2 260…
  • p. 22 …retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program…
  • p. 24 ORN Chapter 1 11 Kelly Johnson %.419r.,‹ 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED gravity (g's) instead of the military…
  • p. 27 …He later advanced to the rank of brigadier general in the reserve. For Strong's contacts…
  • p. 32 …lithium deuteride, a tech- nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US BEACON…
  • p. 33 …between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy, combined with advances in nuclear…
  • p. 58 …secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at…
  • p. 65 …His software algorithms made it possible to model lens designs and determine in advance the effects…
  • p. 76 …UNCLASSIFIED """"Igeret-ALQ Chapter 2 63 advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert…
  • p. 111 …of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of the new Soviet…
  • p. 114 …Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in…
  • p. 174 …concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num- ber of…
  • p. 191 …the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of the mission. The first…
  • p. 250 …so urgent that the Defense Department finally re ente CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Advanced ECM Equipment for Demand…
  • p. 265 …the U-2R needed a camera that incorporated the many im- portant advances that had occurred…
  • p. 266 …This camera was actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a new…
  • p. 282 …aircraft from the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-58B program…
  • p. 295 …In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the…
  • p. 307 …he an- nounced the successful development of an -advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11. which…
  • p. 310 …It was now time to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built…
  • p. 321 …advanced aircraft ever built was to be put out to pasture. The aban- donment of the…
  • p. 325 …when the OXCART program ended in the summer of 1968, no more advanced successor was wait…
  • p. 326 …The most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever…
  • p. 333 …ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance program was the…
  • p. 334 …the end of the usefulness of the world's most advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR…
  • p. 335 …Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft—the OXCART—and…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 6
300
demonstrated its ability to conduct overflights of Cuba by the 5
November deadline, which passed without any hostile action by the
Soviets or Cubans. The detachment then worked to develop the capa-
bility for sustained operations with its five aircraft. All these
preparations were valuable training for the OXCART pro g ram, even
though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect.
Since U-2s continued to satisfy collection requirements for Cuba, the
A-1 2s were reserved for more critical situations.
When the Agency declared that OXCART had achieved emer-
gency operational status on 5 November 1964. the aircraft was still
not prepared for electronic warfare, as only one of the several planned
electronic countermeasure devices had been installed. Nevertheless, a
senior government panel decided that the OXCART could conduct
initial overflights of Cuba without a full complement of warning and
jamming devices, should the need for such missions arise.
One reason for the delay in completing OXCART's electronic
warfare preparations was the Air Force's concern that OXCART use
of existing ECM devices could, in the event of the loss of an
OXCART over hostile territory, compromise the ECM equipment
used by Air Force bombers and fi g hters. Even if OXCART's ECM
devices were merely similar to military ECM systems, the Air Force
still worried that their use would give the Soviets an opportunity to
work out countermeasures.
Such concerns led the Agency to an entirely different approach
to antiradar efforts in Project KEMPSTER. This project attempted to
develop electron guns that could be mounted on the OXCART to gen-
erate an ion cloud in front of the plane that would reduce its radar
cross section. Although this project proved unsuccessful, the CIA also
developed a number of more conventional ECM devices for use in the
OXCART."
As the OXCART's performance and equipment continued to im-
prove. there was renewed consideration of deploying the aircraft
overseas, particularly in Asia, where US military activity was increas-
ing. On 18 March 1965, DC1 McCone. Secretary of Defense
McNamara, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance discussed the
" OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 149-151 (TS Codeword): Notes on the OXCART project by
John Parangtisky. OSA records (TS Codewora
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.