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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 22 …Bell was still being developed.'' Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod- ify…
  • p. 55 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED E0129581.6(dlill>10<25Yrs ISI personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test…
  • p. 73 …On 3 August 1955, Dulles and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the…
  • p. 74 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (TS Codeword). " Brig. Gen. Leo…
  • p. 102 …U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr…
  • p. 107 …did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1, known within the Agency as Detachment…
  • p. 117 …Late on the evening of 3 July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building…
  • p. 127 …The PARAMOUNT Committee worked inside PID headquarters in the Steuart Building. Composed of members from CIA…
  • p. 138 …and prom tly reported the conversation to headquarters. When details of close call reached Washington, James…
  • p. 153 …of Detachment A achieved excellent results, project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe was not…
  • p. 194 …Because the new government had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to…
  • p. 205 …its own building to the new CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward, Col. Stanley W. Beerli…
  • p. 312 …that the performance of an A-12 with 175 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for…
  • p. 319 …12958 1.61111111>1010<25Yrs (Si Project Headquarters in Langley_planned and directed all operational BLACK…
  • p. 323 …Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense Secretary Vance on 10 January 1967 that the A- 12s would…
  • p. 324 …President Johnson con- firmed this decision on 21 May.'" - - Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968 as…
  • p. 334 …Air Force personnel served at all levels of the recon- naissance program, from project headquarters to…
  • p. 365 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (Top Secret Codeword). Interview with…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 6
300
demonstrated its ability to conduct overflights of Cuba by the 5
November deadline, which passed without any hostile action by the
Soviets or Cubans. The detachment then worked to develop the capa-
bility for sustained operations with its five aircraft. All these
preparations were valuable training for the OXCART pro g ram, even
though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect.
Since U-2s continued to satisfy collection requirements for Cuba, the
A-1 2s were reserved for more critical situations.
When the Agency declared that OXCART had achieved emer-
gency operational status on 5 November 1964. the aircraft was still
not prepared for electronic warfare, as only one of the several planned
electronic countermeasure devices had been installed. Nevertheless, a
senior government panel decided that the OXCART could conduct
initial overflights of Cuba without a full complement of warning and
jamming devices, should the need for such missions arise.
One reason for the delay in completing OXCART's electronic
warfare preparations was the Air Force's concern that OXCART use
of existing ECM devices could, in the event of the loss of an
OXCART over hostile territory, compromise the ECM equipment
used by Air Force bombers and fi g hters. Even if OXCART's ECM
devices were merely similar to military ECM systems, the Air Force
still worried that their use would give the Soviets an opportunity to
work out countermeasures.
Such concerns led the Agency to an entirely different approach
to antiradar efforts in Project KEMPSTER. This project attempted to
develop electron guns that could be mounted on the OXCART to gen-
erate an ion cloud in front of the plane that would reduce its radar
cross section. Although this project proved unsuccessful, the CIA also
developed a number of more conventional ECM devices for use in the
OXCART."
As the OXCART's performance and equipment continued to im-
prove. there was renewed consideration of deploying the aircraft
overseas, particularly in Asia, where US military activity was increas-
ing. On 18 March 1965, DC1 McCone. Secretary of Defense
McNamara, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance discussed the
" OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 149-151 (TS Codeword): Notes on the OXCART project by
John Parangtisky. OSA records (TS Codewora
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.