Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
“United Press”14 pages
- Ibid., pp. 80-81 (TS Codeword 'OXCART Story," pp. 17-18 47 OSA History, chap. 20, p. 94 (TS Codeword). CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Chapter 6 296 (0 12950 (S1 Two more A-12s were lost in later testing. On 9 July 1964, arti- cle 133 crashed while landing when a pitch-control servo device froze, rolling the plane into a wing-down position. Ejecting from an altitude of 120 feet, the pilot was blown sideways out of the craft. Although he was not very high off the ground, his parachute did open and he landed during the parachute's first swing. Fortunately he was unhurt, and no news of the accident filtered out of the base. Eighteen months later, on 28 December 1965, article 126 crashed immediately after takeoff because of an improperly wired stability augmentation system. As in the previous crash, the pilot ejected safely. and there was no publicity connected with the crash. An investigation ordered by DCI McCone determined that the wiring error had resulted from negligence, not sabotage." The A-12 made its first long-range, high-speed flight on 27 January 1965. The tlight lasted 100 minutes. 75 minutes of which were flown at speeds greater than Mach 3.1, and the aircraft covered 2.580 miles at altitudes between 75,600 and 80,000 feet. By this time. the OXCART was performing well. The engine inlet, camera, hydrau- lic, navigation, and fli g ht-control systems all demonstrated acceptable reliability. Nevertheless, as the OXCART began flying longer, faster, and higher, new problems arose. The most serious of these problems in- volved the aircraft's wiring. Continuing malfunctions of the inlet con- trols, communications equipment, ECM systems, and cockpit instruments were often attributable to wiring failures. Wiring connec- tors and components had to withstand temperatures above 800'F, structural flexing, vibration, and shock. Such demands were more than the materials could stand. Not all of the OXCART's problems could be traced to materiel failures, however, and Agency officials believed that careless maintenance by Lockheed employees also con- tributed to malfunctions.'" Concerned that Lockheed would not be able to meet the OXCART's schedule for operational readiness, the Office of Special Activities' Director of Technology, John Paran gosky, met with Kelly Johnson on 3 August 1965 to discuss the project's problems. Johnson not only assigned more top-level supervisors to the project but also UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.