Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
“The Advance”26 pages
Secr CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED 294 E0129581.6(dli1l>10<25Yrs IS] yet needed. Agreeing with McCone's position, President Johnson said the issue should be reviewed again in February.'" One additional argument in favor of surfacing the OXCART was the realization that the aircraft could not be used to fly undetected over the Soviet Union. By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar system, codenamed TALL KING. The introduction of this computer-controlled radar undercut one of the basic premises of the OXCART program, the assumption that radar operators would not be able to track high-flying supersonic targets visually because of their small, nonpersistent radar returns. By coupling a computer to a radar, the Soviets could now weight the in- dividual radar returns and identify those produced by hith-flying, very fast objects:" By February 1964 DCI McCone had become convinced that sur- facing was necessary. Soviet development of the TALL KING radar system had eliminated his hope that OXCART would eventually be able to carry out its original intended purpose—overflights of the USSR. The final decision on the issue of surfacing the OXCART came at a National Security Council meeting on 29 February 1964, at which all of the participants supported the decision to surface. That same day President Johnson held a news conference at which he an- nounced the successful development of an -advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11. which has been tested in sustained flight at more than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet." 42 President Johnson had spoken of the A-11 rather than the Agency's A-12, and the aircraft that was actually revealed to the pub- lic was the Air Force's YF-12A interceptor, a project that had already been canceled.'" Following the President's announcement, two of "' John A. McCone, "Memorandum for the Record, Meetin g with the President. Secretary McNamara. Mr. Bundy and DCI," 29 November 1963. DCI records (TS): OSA History. chap. 20. p. 73 (TS Codeword). " OSA History, chap. 20. pp. 147-149 ITS Codeword). John A. McCone. Memorandum for the Record. "Discussion at the NSC Meeting. Attended by the President, all members and the four members of the President's personal staff. 29 February 1964," 2 March 1964. DCI records (S) "OXCART Story," p. 14—erroneously identities the date as 24 February—(S). President Johnson's use of the designator A-I1 at the press conference has sometimes been called an error. but Kelly Johnson wrote the President's press release and chose this designator for security reasons because it referred to the earlier version of the aircraft that lacked the radar-defeating modifications of the A-12. Johnson. "Archangel log," 25 February 1964. UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.