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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
M-12 carrying 0-21 Drone
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
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Chapter 6
293
OXCART. This technology would be invaluable for Air Force pro-
jects such as the B-70 bomber and for the civilian supersonic trans-
. _-
port (SST) then being discussed in Congress. In the fall of 1963,
several Presidential advisers expressed their concern to DCI McCone
that Lockheed had received a $700 million headstart in the develop-
ment of supersonic technology, giving the firm a tremendous advan-
tage over other aerospace companies working on a supersonic
transport. McCone passed these concerns on to President Kennedy on
12 November 1963, just 10 days before the fateful trip to Dallas. The
President instructed CIA and the Defense Department to develop a
plan for surfacing the OXCART but to await further discussions with
him before taking any action."
President Lyndon B. Johnson received a detailed briefing on the
OXCART program from McCone, McNamara, Bundy, and Rusk on
29 November, after just one week in office. McNamara strongly ad-
vocated surfacing a version of the OXCART. McCone was more cau-
tious, calling for the preparation of a statement that could be used
when surfacing became necessary but arguing that such a step was not
"John A. McCone, "Memorandum of Meeting in Cabinet Room for the Purpose of
Discussing the Surfacing of the OX," 21 January 1963, DCI records (TS Codeword);
idem, Memorandum for the Record. Discussion with the President—October 21st-6:00
p.m., 22 October 1963, DCI records (S); OSA Histor), .. chap. 20, pp. 73-74 (TS Codeword)
Se t
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.