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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
NOFORN
Chapter
291
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
that ultimately required a complete redesign of the air-inlet system
that controlled the amount of air admitted to the engine. In the new,
adjustable inlet the cone-shaped projection at the front—known as a
spike—was designed to move in or out as much as three feet in order
to capture and contain the shock wave produced by the aircraft at high
speeds, thus preventing the shock wave from blowing out the fire in-
side the engine:5
Another J58 engine problem in early 1963 was foreign object
damage. Small objects such as pens, pencils, screws, bolts, nuts, and
metal shavings that fell into the engine nacelles during assembly at
Burbank were sucked into the power plant during initial engine testing
nd damaged impeller and compressor vanes. To control the
f5lEiTThckheedd instituted a program that included X-rays, shaking
of the nacelles, installing screens over various air inlets to the engine,
and even having workers wear coveralls without breast pockets.
Another source of foreign object damage was trash on the runways.
The giant J58 engines acted like immense vacuum cleaners, sucking in
anything lying loose on the paving as they propelled the A-12 down
the runway for takeoff. To prevent engine damage,' personnel
had to sweep and vacuum the runway before aircraft takeotlf.Th
_ -
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NEW VERSIONS OF THE OXCART
In 1962 the Agency and the Air Force ordered two more versions of
the OXCART (in addition to the A-12 and the YF- I2A). One was a
modification of the A-12 to carry and launch ramjet-powered,
43-feet-long drones capable of reaching Mach 3.3 The two-seater
mothership received the designation M-12; the drone was called the
D-2I. This project was known as TAGBOARD. The original develop-
ment of the drones and mothership was sponsored by the CIA, but in
June 1963 the project was turned over to the Air Force, which had
overall responsibility for unmanned reconnaissance aircraft.
Development of the M- I2/D-21 combination continued until 1966,
when an unsuccessful D-21 launch caused the loss of its mothership
and the death of one of the crew members. Afterward the Air Force
turned to B-52 bombers to carry the drones."
"OSA History, chap. 20, p. 67 (TS Codeword).
'Johnson. "Development of Lockheed SR-71," p. 12.
" OSA History, chap. 20, p. 71: Jay Miller. Lockheed SR-7I (Al21YFI2/D-21), Aerofax
Minigraph 1 (Arlington. Texas: Aerofax, Inc.. 1985), p. 3.
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UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.