Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
“US Navy”11 pages
SecrefTSQRN Chapter 6 285 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED to reduce expenditures. After much refiguring, project officials de- cided to decrease the number of deliverable aircraft. Amendment No. 11 to the contract reduced from 12 to 10 the number of A- 12s, for a total cost of $161.2 million:7 The cancellation of these two A- 12s was offset by an Air Force order for the development of a supersonic interceptor variant of the A-12 to serve as a replacement for the North American F- 108A Rapier interceptor project, which had been canceled in late 1960. With the assistance of the the Air Force entered into an agreement with Lockneed to proauce uiree AF-12 air- craft, based on the A-12 design but modified to carry a second crew- man and three air-to-air missiles. This effort was called Project KEDLOCK. The AF-12 (later redesignated the YF-12A) was de- signed to intercept enemy bombers long before they reached the United States, and initial Air Force plans envisioned a force of up to 100 of these supersonic interceptors. In fact, only three of these planes were built and delivered during the 1963-64 time frame because Secretary of Defense McNamara canceled the program as a cost-cut- ting measure. The Air Force bore all of the costs of the YF-I2A pro- ject.; CIA was only involved in helping to write -black" contracts.4 Lockheed was not the only OXCART contractor having trouble containing costs: Pratt & Whitney was fighting an even bigger battle. In mid-I961, Pratt & Whitney overruns threatened to halt the entire OXCART project. At the suggestion of Cdr. William Holcomb in the office of the Chief of Naval Materiel, Richard Bissell asked the Navy to assist in funding the 158's development. After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the J58 might be used in future Navy air- craft, VAdm. William A. Schoech, Chief of the Navy Materiel Command that had originally financed the J58 engine, authorized the transfer of $38 million in end-of-year funds to the project, thus keep- ing the OXCART's head above water."9 As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 46-47, 51-55 (TS Codewordi r OXCART Story.- p. 10 (S). OSA History, chap. 20, pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword). Parangosky interview (S): OSA History. chap. 20. P. 55 (TS Codeword). During this period, Kelly Johnson was very disappointed with Pratt & Whitney'i work on the 158, particularly when they shocked him in September 1961 with the news that the engine would be overweight. underpowered, and late. Johnson, "Archangel log," II September 1961. ED 129581.6hili1l>1010<25Yrs IS1 UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.