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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
'OXCART Story.-
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
SecrefT
Chapter 6
284
EO 129581.61d1[11>1010<25Yrs
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storage capacity, and runway length were insufficient for the
OXCART program, the site's remote location would greatly ease the
task of maintaining the program's security, and a moderate construc-
tion program could provide adequate facilities. Construction began in
September 1960; a C-47 shuttle service ferried work crews from
Burbank to Las Vegas and from Las Vegas to the site.
The new 8,500-foot runway was completed by 15 November
1960. Kelly Johnson had been reluctant to have a standard Air Force
runway with expansion joints every 25 feet because he feared the
joints would set up undesirable vibrations in the speedy aircraft. At
his suggestion a 150-foot wide runway was therefore constructed of
six 25-foot-wide longitudinal sections, each 150 feet long but stag-
gered. This layout put most of the expansion joints parallel to the di-
rection of aircraft roll and reduced the frequency of the joints.
Additional improvements included the resurfacing of 18 miles of
hi g hway leading to the base so that heavy fuel trucks could bring in
the necessary fuel. The need for additional buildings on the base was
met by the Navy. Three surplus Navy hangars were dismantled,
moved, and reassembled on the north side of the base, and more than
100 surplus Navy housing buildings were also transported to
All essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery
date of the first A-12 on 1 August 1961.'
Unfortunately, this delivery date began to slip further and further
into the future. Delays in obtaining the titanium, and later the 158 en-
gines, caused the postponement of the final assembly of the first plane.
Eventually, Kelly Johnson and Agency project officials decided to be-
gin testing without waiting for the 158 engines by using Pratt &
Whitney J75/ I9W engines, designed for the Convair F-106, to test the
A-12 at altitudes up to 50,000 feet and at speeds up to Mach 1.6. Such
a change, however, meant that the en g ine compartment of the first air-
craft had to be reconfigured to accommodate the J75 en g ine. Lockheed
hoped that this substitution would permit the delivery of the first A-12
by 22 December 1961 and its initial test flight by 27 February 1962.
Lockheed ran into so many technological problems with the
OXCART effort that by October 1961 its costs had swollen to $136
million and were still climbing. Something obviously had to be done
OSA Histbry. chap. 20. pp. 39-40, 43, 51 (TS Codcword)
pp. 7-9 (S).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.