Documents / FOIA release

CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
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'OXCART Story... p. 5 (S); OSA History, chap. 20. p. 33 (TS Cock:word).
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Chapter 6
280
OXCART pilot suit
(B-120) characterized by great strength. relatively light weight, and
good resistance to high temperatures. but high in cost. As strong as
stainless steel, titanium weighed slightly more than half as much.
Obtaining sufficient quantities of titanium of a quality suitable for
fabricating aircraft components proved very difficult because methods
for maintaining good quality control during the milling of titanium
were not fully developed. Up to 80 percent of the early deliveries
from Titanium Metals Corporation had to be rejected. It was not until
1961, when company officials were informed of the objectives and
high priority of the OXCART program, that problems with the tita-
nium supply ended. Even after sufficient high-quality titanium was
received, Lockheed's difficulties with the metal were not over.
Titanium was so hard that tools normally used in aircraft fabrication
broke; new ones therefore had to be devised. Assembly line produc-
tion was not possible, and the cost of the program mounted well
above original estimates.'"
The high temperatures that the OXCART would encounter also
necessitated planning for the pilot's safety and comfort because the
inside of the aircraft would be like a moderately hot oven. To save
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.