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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 18 …Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the . Pentagon for funding. He had not…
  • p. 20 …Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in…
  • p. 22 …become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business…
  • p. 24 …for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon officials that…
  • p. 26 …He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon…
  • p. 27 …with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954. six days before the Wright Air Development…
  • p. 52 …Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to go to the Pentagon…
  • p. 91 …1-le then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air…
  • p. 92 …After a half hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to ask where the crippled…
Sere N
Chapter 6
273
Lockheed A-12
Mach 3.2
4,120 nm
3,800 nm
84.500 ft.
91,000 ft.
97,600 ft.
$96.6 million
Convair KINGF1SH
Mach 3.2
3,400 nm
3,400 nm
85,000 ft.
88,000 ft.
94,000 ft. -
$121.6 million
Speed
Range (total)
Range (at altitude)
Cruising Altitude
Start
Midrange
- -End
Cost summary (for 12
aircraft without engines)
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
characteristics, although the Lockheed design's specifications were
slightly better in each category. The Lockheed design was also prefer-
able in terms of overall cost. In the vital area of vulnerability to radar
detection, however, the Convair design was superior. Its smaller size
and internally mounted engines gave it a smaller radar cross section
than the Lockheed A-12."
Comparison of Lockheed and
Convair Designs
Some of the CIA representatives initially favored the Convair
KINGFISH design because of its smaller radar cross section, but they
were eventually convinced to support the Lockheed design by the Air
Force members of the panel, who believed that Convair's cost over-
runs and production delays on the B-58 project might be repeated in
this new project. In contrast, Lockheed had produced the U-2 under
budget and on time. Another factor favoring the A-12 was security.
Lockheed had experience in running a highly secure facility (the
Skunk Works) in which all of the key employees were already cleared
by the Agency.
Despite its vote in favor of the Lockheed proposal, the selection
panel remained concerned about the A-12's vulnerability to radar de-
tection and therefore required Lockheed to prove its concept for
reducing the A-12's radar cross section by 1 January 1960. On 14
September 1959, the CIA awarded a four-month contract to Lockheed
" OSA History, chap. 20. pp. 18-19 (TS Codeword).
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UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.