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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 22 …Bell was still being developed.'' Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod- ify…
  • p. 55 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED E0129581.6(dlill>10<25Yrs ISI personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test…
  • p. 73 …On 3 August 1955, Dulles and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the…
  • p. 74 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (TS Codeword). " Brig. Gen. Leo…
  • p. 102 …U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr…
  • p. 107 …did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1, known within the Agency as Detachment…
  • p. 117 …Late on the evening of 3 July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building…
  • p. 127 …The PARAMOUNT Committee worked inside PID headquarters in the Steuart Building. Composed of members from CIA…
  • p. 138 …and prom tly reported the conversation to headquarters. When details of close call reached Washington, James…
  • p. 153 …of Detachment A achieved excellent results, project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe was not…
  • p. 194 …Because the new government had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to…
  • p. 205 …its own building to the new CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward, Col. Stanley W. Beerli…
  • p. 312 …that the performance of an A-12 with 175 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for…
  • p. 319 …12958 1.61111111>1010<25Yrs (Si Project Headquarters in Langley_planned and directed all operational BLACK…
  • p. 323 …Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense Secretary Vance on 10 January 1967 that the A- 12s would…
  • p. 324 …President Johnson con- firmed this decision on 21 May.'" - - Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968 as…
  • p. 334 …Air Force personnel served at all levels of the recon- naissance program, from project headquarters to…
  • p. 365 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (Top Secret Codeword). Interview with…
Sere N
Chapter 6
273
Lockheed A-12
Mach 3.2
4,120 nm
3,800 nm
84.500 ft.
91,000 ft.
97,600 ft.
$96.6 million
Convair KINGF1SH
Mach 3.2
3,400 nm
3,400 nm
85,000 ft.
88,000 ft.
94,000 ft. -
$121.6 million
Speed
Range (total)
Range (at altitude)
Cruising Altitude
Start
Midrange
- -End
Cost summary (for 12
aircraft without engines)
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
characteristics, although the Lockheed design's specifications were
slightly better in each category. The Lockheed design was also prefer-
able in terms of overall cost. In the vital area of vulnerability to radar
detection, however, the Convair design was superior. Its smaller size
and internally mounted engines gave it a smaller radar cross section
than the Lockheed A-12."
Comparison of Lockheed and
Convair Designs
Some of the CIA representatives initially favored the Convair
KINGFISH design because of its smaller radar cross section, but they
were eventually convinced to support the Lockheed design by the Air
Force members of the panel, who believed that Convair's cost over-
runs and production delays on the B-58 project might be repeated in
this new project. In contrast, Lockheed had produced the U-2 under
budget and on time. Another factor favoring the A-12 was security.
Lockheed had experience in running a highly secure facility (the
Skunk Works) in which all of the key employees were already cleared
by the Agency.
Despite its vote in favor of the Lockheed proposal, the selection
panel remained concerned about the A-12's vulnerability to radar de-
tection and therefore required Lockheed to prove its concept for
reducing the A-12's radar cross section by 1 January 1960. On 14
September 1959, the CIA awarded a four-month contract to Lockheed
" OSA History, chap. 20. pp. 18-19 (TS Codeword).
Se
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.