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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 4 …Intelligence Systems Panel 21 British Overflight of Kapustin Yar 23 The Intelligence Systems Panel and the…
  • p. 29 …Operations Staff, OSI, "Overflight of Kapustin Yar." 15 October 1954, OSI (OSWR) records TS, down- graded…
  • p. 36 …British Overflight of Kapustin Yar The British were also working on high-altitude reconnaissance air- craft…
  • p. 37 …its members about the British overflight of Kapustin Yar because they were not cleared for this…
  • p. 122 …bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in 1953. The US reply, sent to…
  • p. 152 …This facility was used to test radars against incoming missiles fired from Kapustin Yar, 1,400…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
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designs and continued the competition. Lockheed continued to work
on developing a design that would be less vulnerable to detection, and
Convair received a new CIA contract to design an air-breathing
twin-engine aircraft that would meet the general specifications being
followed by Lockheed."
Following recommendations by the Land committee, both
Lockheed and Convair incorporated the Pratt & Whitney J58 power
plant into their designs. This engine had originally been developed
for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the Glenn L. Martin
Company's P6M Seamaster, and was the most powerful engine
available. In 1958 the Navy had canceled the Seamaster program,
which had left Pratt & Whitney without a buyer for the powerful 158
engine.'
Although the Land committee had not yet found an acceptable
design, it informed President Eisenhower on 20 July 1959 that the
search was making good progress. Concerned about the U-2's vulner-
ability to detection and possible interception and aware that the
photosatellite project was encountering significant problems, the
President gave his final approval to the high-speed reconnaissance
aircraft project:3
THE SELECTION OF THE LOCKHEED DESIGN
By the late summer of 1959, both Convair and Lockheed had com-
pleted new designs for a follow-on to the U-2. Convair's entry, known
as the KINGFISH, used much of the technology developed for the
F-102, F-106, and B-58, including stainless steel honeycomb skin,
planiform wing design, and a crew capsule escape system, which
eliminated the need for the pilot to wear a pressurized suit. The
KINGFISH had two side-by-side 158 engines inside the fuselage,
which significantly reduced the radar cross section. Two additional
OSA History, chap. 20, p. 15 (TS Codeword).
Cunningham interview, 4 October 1983 (TS Cudeword); Joseph V. Charyk. interview
by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording, Washington. DC, 5 December 1984 (TS
Codeword).
"Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Memorandum of Conference with the President," 20 July 1959.
WHOSS, ALPHA, DDEL (TS).
'S'escet.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.