Documents / FOIA release

CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 12 …later, at press conferences in February and July 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence…
  • p. 40 …MIT Press. 1977), p. 68: Beschloss, Maplay, p. 74: TCP Report. pp. 185-186 (S). UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 98 …The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from…
  • p. 102 …not only press releases and the public line to be taken, but also the suspension of…
  • p. 107 …The "provisional" designation gave the U-2 detachments greater security because provisional Air Force units did…
  • p. 112 …at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in…
  • p. 125 …Dial Press, 1982), pp. 45-47. Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 174 …McElroy stressed that the gap would be temporary and that at its end the United States…
  • p. 195 …in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to…
  • p. 198 …DCI records (S). " United States Congress, Senate. Foreign Relations Committee, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign…
  • p. 307 …By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar…
  • p. 315 …To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an…
  • p. 328 …at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the…
  • p. 362 …MIT Press, 1977. Kistiakowsky. George B. A Scientist at the White House. Cambridge: Harvard University Press…
--Irrefet-44
Chapter 6
269
Lockheed A-11
UNCLASSIFIED
to be ignited. Since ramjet engines had only been tested in wind tun-
nels, there was no available data to prove that these engines would
work in the application proposed by Convair. The second uncertain
factor was the B-58B bomber that was supposed to achieve Mach 2.2
before launching the FISH above 35,000 feet. This version of the
B-58 was still in the design stage.
Convair's proposal suffered a major setback in June 1959, when
the Air Force canceled the B-58B project. Conversion of the older,
slower B-58A into a supersonic launching platform for the FISH was
ruled out by the high cost and technical difficulties involved.
Moreover, the Air Force was unwilling to part with two aircraft from
the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-58B
program not been canceled, however, the FISH proposal would proba-
bly not have been feasible. Convair engineers had calculated that the
added weight of the FISH would prevent the B-58B from achieving
the speed required to ignite the parasite aircraft's ramjet engines.
The Convair proposal was therefore unusable, but the Lockheed
design with its high radar cross section was also unacceptable to the
Land committee. On 14 July 1959, the committee rejected both
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.