Documents / FOIA release

CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …agreement with the Air Force and the Navy (which at that time was also interested in…
  • p. 147 …turned to the Navy, which granted permission for Detachment C to use the Naval Air Station…
  • p. 180 …The Army, Navy, and CIA, however, doubted that any had been deployed, because none could be…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais- sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to illustrate his…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air- craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional buildings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus Navy…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the J58 might be used in future Navy…
--Irrefet-44
Chapter 6
269
Lockheed A-11
UNCLASSIFIED
to be ignited. Since ramjet engines had only been tested in wind tun-
nels, there was no available data to prove that these engines would
work in the application proposed by Convair. The second uncertain
factor was the B-58B bomber that was supposed to achieve Mach 2.2
before launching the FISH above 35,000 feet. This version of the
B-58 was still in the design stage.
Convair's proposal suffered a major setback in June 1959, when
the Air Force canceled the B-58B project. Conversion of the older,
slower B-58A into a supersonic launching platform for the FISH was
ruled out by the high cost and technical difficulties involved.
Moreover, the Air Force was unwilling to part with two aircraft from
the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-58B
program not been canceled, however, the FISH proposal would proba-
bly not have been feasible. Convair engineers had calculated that the
added weight of the FISH would prevent the B-58B from achieving
the speed required to ignite the parasite aircraft's ramjet engines.
The Convair proposal was therefore unusable, but the Lockheed
design with its high radar cross section was also unacceptable to the
Land committee. On 14 July 1959, the committee rejected both
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.