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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
RN
Chapter 6
263
Johnson, "Archangel log," 17-24
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Lockheed design for a hydrogen-powered aircraft (the CL-400). The
committee examined two other Kelly Johnson designs at this
meeting—a tailless subsonic aircraft with a very-low-radar cross sec-
tion (the G2A) and a new supersonic design (the A-2)—and did not
accept either one, the former because of its slow speed and the latter
because of its dependence on exotic fuels for its ramjets and its over-
all high cost. The committee approved the continuation of Convair's
work on a ramjet-powered Mach 4.0 "parasite" aircraft that would be
launched from a specially configured version of the B-58B bomber.
The design was termed a parasite because it could not take off on its
own but needed a larger aircraft to carry it aloft and accelerate it to
the speed required to start the ramjet engine. The Convair design was
called the FISH.'
Two months later, after reviewing the Convair proposal and yet
another Lockheed design for a high-speed reconnaissance aircraft (the
A-3), the Land committee concluded in late November 1958 that it
would indeed be feasible to build an aircraft whose speed and altitude
would make radar tracking difficult or impossible. The committee,
therefore, recommended that DCI Dulles ask President Eisenhower to
approve further pursuit of the project and to provide funds for addi-
tional studies and tests.6
On 17 December 1958, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell briefed
the President on the progress toward a successor to the U-2. Also
present were Land and Purcell from the advisory committee,
Presidential Science Adviser James Killian, and Air Force Secretary
Donald Quarles. DCI Dulles reviewed the results of the U-2 missions
to date and stated his belief that a successor to the U-2 could be used
all over the world and "would have a much greater invulnerability to
detection."
Bissell then described the two competing projects by Lockheed
and Convair, noting that the chief question at the moment was
whether to use air launch or ground takeoff. The next phase, he add-
ed, would be detailed engineering, at the end of which it was pro-
posed that 12 aircraft be ordered at a cost of about $100 million. (01295111.6(dlill>111<25Yrs
(Si
OSA History, chap. 20, p. 8 (TS Codeword);
September 1958.
"OSA Chronology. p. 21 (TS Codeword)
History, chap. 20, p. 8 (TS Cocleword); Jo
"OXCART Story," p. 3 (S); OSA
hangel log," 12 November 1958.
""SecztL
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.