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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
Secret
Chapter 6
260
(0 12958 1.61O1l>10.425Yrs
IS)
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
altitudes of 80,000 to 90,000 feet but only at subsonic speeds, just
enough to keep it airborne.'
The slow-flying Northrop design did not solve the problem of
radar detection, and in 1957 the emphasis switched to supersonic de-
signs. In August 1957, the Scientific Engineering Institute (SEI),
firm that had been working on ways to reduce tie
U-2 's vuineraDnity to radar, began to investigate the possibility of
designing an aircraft with a very small radar cross section. SEI soon
discovered that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances of de-
tection by radar." From this point on, the CIA's attention focused in-
creasingly on the possibility of building an aircraft that could fly at
both extremely high speeds and high altitudes while incorporating
the best ideas in radar-absorbing or radar-deflecting techniques.
(012958 1.6Idlill>10<25Yrs
IS)
THE EVALUATION OF DESIGNS FOR
A SUCCESSOR TO THE U-2
By the autumn of 1957, Bissell and Gibbs had collected so many
ideas for a successor to the U-2 that Bissell asked DCI Dulles for per-
mission to establish an advisory committee to assist in the selection
process. Bissell also felt that the support of a committee of prominent
scientists and engineers would prove useful when it came time to ask
for funding for such an expensive project. Edwin Land became the
chairman of the new committee, which included some of the scien-
tists and engineers who had served on previous advisory bodies for
overhead reconnaissance: Edward Purcell, Allen F. Donovan, H.
Guyford Stever, and Eugene P. Kiefer. The Air Force's chief scientist,
Courtland D. Perkins, was also a member. The committee first met in
November 1957 and held six more meetings between July 1958 and
the late summer of 1959. The meetings usually took place in Land's
Boston office and almost always included the Air Force's Assistant
Secretary for Research and Development, Dr. Joseph V. Charyk, and
his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air-
craft manufacturers also attended some of the meetings.'
Donovan interview (S).
The OXCART Story," Studies in Intelligence 15 (Winter 1971):2 (S).
'Clarence L. Johnson, Report No. SP-1362, "History of the OXCART Program,"
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. 1 July 1968, p. 1 (TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.