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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 91 …Early in the program Bissell and Ritland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation…
  • p. 95 …of their mission kept the level of cooperation high. The group always attempted to reach a…
  • p. 143 …deception project since its early days, he cooperated reluctantly because he disliked adding attachments that made…
  • p. 196 …as possible while giving the appearance of cooperating with his cap- tors. To extract the maximum…
  • p. 287 …by Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G) in cooperation with the Scientific Engineering Institute at a small…
  • p. 302 …Halaby cooperated fully with the Agency and personally briefed all FAA regional chiefs on how to…
  • p. 334 …The cooperation between the Agency and the Air Force that began with the U-2 and…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
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Chapter 6
259
The U-2's Intended Successor:
Project OXCART,
1956-1968
Before the U-2 became operational in June 1956, CIA project offi-
cials had estimated that its life expectancy for flying safely over the
Soviet Union would be between 18 months and two years. After
overflights began and the Soviets demonstrated the capability of
tracking and attempting to intercept the U-2, this estimate seemed
too optimistic. By August 1956, Richard Bissell was so concerned
.a6Out the U-2's vulnerability that he despaired of its ability to avoid
destruction for six months, let alone two years.
To extend the U-2's useful operational life, project officials first
attempted to reduce the aircraft's vulnerability to detection by Soviet
radars. Project RAINBOW's efforts to mask the radar image of the
U-2 not only proved ineffective, but actually made the aircraft more
vulnerable by adding extra weight that reduced its maximum altitude.
Because Soviet radar operators continued to find and track U-2s
equipped with antiradar systems, the CIA canceled Project
RAINBOW in May 1958.
Long before the failure of Project RAINBOW, Richard Bissell
and his Air Force assistant, Col. Jack A. Gibbs, had begun to look for
a more radical solution to the problem of Soviet radar detection—an
entirely new aircraft. In the late summer of 1956, the two officials
visited a number of airframe contractors in a search for new ideas.
Among the more unusual was Northrop Aviation's proposal for a gi-
gantic aircraft with a very-high-lift wing. Because it would not be
made of metal, the wing would require a type of bridge truss on its
upper side to give it rigidity. The proposed aircraft would achieve
Sbet
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.