Documents / FOIA release

CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1
Chapter 5
251
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an aircraft
carrier. Although the idea of using a floating airbase to avoid political
sensitivity proved feasible, the cost did not. Aircraft carriers are enor-
mously expensive to operate and require an entire flotilla of vessels to
protect and service them. The movement of large numbers of big
ships is difficult to conceal and cannot be hastily accomplished, while
the deployment of a solitary U-2 to a remote airfield can take place
overnight.
A New Version of the U-2
By the summer of 1966, the number of flyable Agency U-2s had
dwindled to six—two at
in California—wan three more in LOCKIICCU ullueigu-
ing re Agency had originally ordered 20 U-2s in 1954-55
(the Air Force had purchased another 31 of these planes), and Kelly
Johnson's crew at the Skunk Works had managed to assemble four
additional craft for the Agency from leftover spare parts and usable
sections of crashed aircraft. This brought the total number of U-2s ac-
quired by the Agency to 24, for an average cost o leach.
_ -
At this point, the DC1 and the Secretary of Defense on 1 August
1966 decided to place an order with Lockheed for ei g ht more aircraft
to be used in the Agency and Air Force U-2 programs—a completely
new version of the aircraft. Kelly Johnson had been working on ways
to improve the performance of the U-2 since early 1965 because he
was concerned that all the modifications and additions to the aircraft
over the years had made it so heavy that it had lost almost half of its
ran ge and several thousand feet in cruisin g. altitude.7 ' The new model,
known as the U-2R, had a lon ger fuselage and a wider wingspan than
the original U-2. The U-2R's wings were 103 feet long with 1,000
square feet of lifting surface, in contrast to the U-2C's 80-foot wings
with only 600 square feet. The longer fuselage of the U-2R made it
possible to provide two pressurized bays with an additional 2.2 cubic
meters of equipment space and also achieve a better weight distribu-
tion. The net result of all these improvements was a much better per-
forming aircraft. No lon g er did the U-2 pilot have to worry about
keeping the aircraft's speed at altitude within a 6-knot window in the
stall/buffet corner of the flight envelope. The envelope was now ex-
tended to 20 knots, which greatly improved flyability.
E0 12958 1.6fillill>1010<25Yrs
Johnson, "Log for Project X, - 2 February 1965. June to October 1965, 20 October
1965: Johnson. - U-2R Log, - January to August 1966.
ret
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.