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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
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Chapter 5
251
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an aircraft
carrier. Although the idea of using a floating airbase to avoid political
sensitivity proved feasible, the cost did not. Aircraft carriers are enor-
mously expensive to operate and require an entire flotilla of vessels to
protect and service them. The movement of large numbers of big
ships is difficult to conceal and cannot be hastily accomplished, while
the deployment of a solitary U-2 to a remote airfield can take place
overnight.
A New Version of the U-2
By the summer of 1966, the number of flyable Agency U-2s had
dwindled to six—two at
in California—wan three more in LOCKIICCU ullueigu-
ing re Agency had originally ordered 20 U-2s in 1954-55
(the Air Force had purchased another 31 of these planes), and Kelly
Johnson's crew at the Skunk Works had managed to assemble four
additional craft for the Agency from leftover spare parts and usable
sections of crashed aircraft. This brought the total number of U-2s ac-
quired by the Agency to 24, for an average cost o leach.
_ -
At this point, the DC1 and the Secretary of Defense on 1 August
1966 decided to place an order with Lockheed for ei g ht more aircraft
to be used in the Agency and Air Force U-2 programs—a completely
new version of the aircraft. Kelly Johnson had been working on ways
to improve the performance of the U-2 since early 1965 because he
was concerned that all the modifications and additions to the aircraft
over the years had made it so heavy that it had lost almost half of its
ran ge and several thousand feet in cruisin g. altitude.7 ' The new model,
known as the U-2R, had a lon ger fuselage and a wider wingspan than
the original U-2. The U-2R's wings were 103 feet long with 1,000
square feet of lifting surface, in contrast to the U-2C's 80-foot wings
with only 600 square feet. The longer fuselage of the U-2R made it
possible to provide two pressurized bays with an additional 2.2 cubic
meters of equipment space and also achieve a better weight distribu-
tion. The net result of all these improvements was a much better per-
forming aircraft. No lon g er did the U-2 pilot have to worry about
keeping the aircraft's speed at altitude within a 6-knot window in the
stall/buffet corner of the flight envelope. The envelope was now ex-
tended to 20 knots, which greatly improved flyability.
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Johnson, "Log for Project X, - 2 February 1965. June to October 1965, 20 October
1965: Johnson. - U-2R Log, - January to August 1966.
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UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.