Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
“The Advance”26 pages
Chapter 5 207 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED defenses of Cuba. If this overflight did not provoke an SA-2 reaction, the study recommended -maximum coverage of the western end of the island by multiple U-2s simultaneously." " Because the danger posed by the SA-2 sites was one of the major topics at the Special Group meeting, DCI McCone brought along Col. Jack C. Ledford (USAF), head of the Office of Special Activities, who presented a vulnerability analysis that estimated the odds of losing a U-2 over Cuba at 1 in 6. The Special Group approved the recommended flight over San Cristobal. As the Special Group meeting was breaking up, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the Air Force repre- sentative questioned the adequacy of the Agency's cover story, which was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to Puerto Rico. The Air Force and DOD representatives argued that it would be better to use Air Force pilots and state in the event of a mis- hap that the overflight was a routine Air Force peripheral surveillance mission that had gone off course. McCone then asked Colonel Ledford's opinion of the proposed change. Ledford agreed that the .DOD cover story was better but pointed out that the SAC U-2s were much more vulnerable than those of the Agency, which had superior electronic countermeasures and a higher maximum altitude. Ledford then suggested that Air Force pilots use Agency aircraft after receiv- ing familiarization training. After leaving the Special Group meeting. McCone and Gilpatric met with President Kennedy, who approved the San Cristobal mission and the use of Air Force pilots." Two days later (I I October), Air Force and CIA representatives met to discuss the change in cover stories. Herbert Scoville, CIA Deputy Director for Research, agreed that in the lon g run the Air Force cover story was best but emphasized that an Air Force pilot should not be used until he had received adequate training. The con- versation then turned to the issue of who would run the next mission, the CIA or the Air Force. Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called DCI McCone and obtained his consent. Shortly thereafter, McCone left " Ibid.. p. 31 (TS Codeword). Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford, USAF Ret., interview by Gregory W. Pedlow. Washington. DC. 20 February 1987 (S); Memorandum for DC1 IvIcCone from Herbert Scoville. Jr.. Deputy Director (Research). "The Chronology of Events Leading to the Transfer of Cuban vertli o ht Responsibility... 28 February 1963. DC1. records S). (0129511.6(dilll>10<25Yrs (S) UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.