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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 4 …Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft 8 Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA 13 Scientists…
  • p. 6 …260 Competition Between Lockheed and Convair 267 The Selection of the Lockheed Design 270 Efforts To…
  • p. 12 …excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2 (1983). E0129581.131d111>10<25Yrs…
  • p. 21 …August 1953, OS1 records (S). " Jay Miller, Lockheed U-2, Aerograph 3 (Austin, Texas: Aerofax, 1983…
  • p. 22 …Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the…
  • p. 23 …high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft Chapter 1 10 Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the…
  • p. 24 …Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 12. For more details on Kelly Johnson's original proposal. see…
  • p. 25 12 The Lockheed CL-282 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Chapter 1 Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General LeMay…
  • p. 26 …Despite the Air Force's selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the…
  • p. 27 …six days before the Wright Air Development Command began to evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described…
  • p. 28 …range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282. Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL…
  • p. 29 …Few details about Dulles's precise attitude toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available, but…
  • p. 30 …At this point, the summer of 1954, Lockheed's CL-282 proposal still lacked official support…
  • p. 37 …ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel to southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design…
  • p. 39 …Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by September 1954…
  • p. 40 …Council.46 Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 Even before the final Technological Capabilities…
  • p. 42 …Agency.49 Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft soon after he…
  • p. 43 …Chapter 1 30 briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the 24…
  • p. 44 …During September and October the Project Three study group met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design…
  • p. 47 …The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the reach of…
  • p. 48 …Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar- gued that the Bell…
  • p. 49 …He used Gardner's statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the project, which…
  • p. 50 …small group of prominent scientists that the Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais- sance…
  • p. 52 …afternoon of 3 December, they Although the Lockheed CL-282 was not designated as the U…
  • p. 53 …Eventually Bissell asked who was going to pay for the airframes to be built by Lockheed…
  • p. 55 …This category in- cluded maintenance personnel from Lockheed (five per aircraft), the pilots, and support personnel…
  • p. 57 …Then on 22 December 1954, the Agency signed a letter contract with Lockheed, using the codename…
  • p. 58 …The U-2 would have a The Lockheed "Skunk Works" was named after the Kickapoo Joy…
  • p. 59 …Johnson, -A High-Altitude Reconnaissance Aircraft, - 9 December 1954, Lockheed Contract Files, OSA Records (S). UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 61 …Reconnaissance Aircraft, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Report 10420. 28 January 1955. pp. 7-9, OSA Recordsi \ (5…
  • p. 63 …1954, even before the CIA adopted the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he would…
  • p. 69 …Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20. Sè'biet UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 74 …aircraft—remained the ex- clusive province of Lockheed:9 As a result of this agreement, CIA…
  • p. 77 …The first model of the pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for…
  • p. 79 …Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed CL-282 was going to be known officially as the…
  • p. 81 …former director of Lockheed's Skunk Works, to Donald E. Welzenbach, 14 March 1986 (U): Miller…
  • p. 84 …7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22. OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 12-14…
  • p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Iwithout arousing a great deal of curiosity. The…
  • p. 88 …Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAL pilots who were to be trained by Lockheed…
  • p. 90 …CIA, which then placed an order with Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be…
  • p. 107 …U-2 cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown by the USAF…
  • p. 143 …Lockheed mechanics had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a Lockheed test…
  • p. 144 …Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed test pilot Robert Sicker bailed out but was struck…
  • p. 145 …The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots, as well as the pro- totype…
  • p. 157 …As a substitute, Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant qualities, but this…
  • p. 162 …a series of tests over Edwards AFB. Lockheed began coating the 11-2s with a standard…
  • p. 188 …Although it haL refurbished by Lockheed and now had the more powerful 175 engine that would…
  • p. 200 …Beschloss claims that Powers was fired by Lockheed for criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which…
  • p. 209 …Some poetic justice in this.' One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to up…
  • p. 211 …In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that they could be refueled in…
  • p. 220 …story, which was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to Puerto Rico…
  • p. 230 …CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Chapter 5 Late in 1958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U…
  • p. 264 …1966 decided to place an order with Lockheed for ei g ht more aircraft to be…
  • p. 265 …Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who checked out this new aircraft…
  • p. 266 …began coming off the production line at Lockheed in-the autumn of 1968, CIA and the…
  • p. 273 …SP-1362, "History of the OXCART Program," Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. 1 July 1968, p…
  • p. 275 …Personnel at Lockheed's Skunk Works referred to these aircraft concepts as "Archangel-1," "Archangel-2…
  • p. 276 RN Chapter 6 263 Johnson, "Archangel log," 17-24 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Lockheed design for a hydrogen…
  • p. 280 …During the first half of 1959, both Lockheed and Convair worked to reduce the radar cross…
  • p. 281 …In early June, Lockheed submitted a design for a ground-launched aircraft known as the A…
"e7C-i t
Chapter 5
201
DCI John A. McCone
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
of the nature of the Soviet buildup in Cuba. Two days after the mis-
sion, the CIA reported in the President's Intelligence Checklist that
there were at least eight surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites in the
western half of Cuba. 8 (The map on page 202 shows the routes taken
by the two August overflights.)
On 5 September the next U-2 overflight (mission 3089) provided
more evidence of the Soviet buildup. The mission's photography
showed three more SAM sites and also revealed a MiG-21, one of the
newest Soviet fighter aircraft, at the Santa Clara airfield.
The discovery of SAMs in Cuba had a twofold effect on the US
reconnaissance effort over Cuba. First, it added substance to DCI
McCone's fears that Cuba might become a base for Soviet medi-
um-range ballistic missiles (he argued that SAM sites would only be
set up to protect high-priority facilities such as missile bases). At this
time, however, McCone's suspicions were not shared by other offi-
cials in the Agency or the administration. The second and most signif-
icant effect of the discovery of SAMs in Cuba was to make the
administration far more cautious in its use of U-2s for reconnaissance
of- the island. As the loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 in May 1960.
had demonstrated, the U-2 was very vulnerable to the SA-2 missile.
Within the administration, concern mounted about the U-2's vul-
nerability to SAMs in Cuba and the possibility that a loss could cause
a major diplomatic crisis. Such fears increased as the result of two
incidents in other parts of the world. On 30 August 1962, a SAC U-2
on a peripheral reconnaissance mission overflew Sakhalin Island in
the Far East, prompting a Soviet protest on 4 September. The United
States apologized for the intrusion. Then on 8 September, a U-2 I
phis CIA reconnaissance program is discussed later in this
chapter in the section on Asian operations). Increasing concern about
U-2 vulnerability led to an impromptu meeting on 10 September 1962
of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Adviser
McGeorge Bundy, and DDCI Marshall S. Carter (in place of the DCI,
who was on his honeymoon in France). The Secretary of State ob-
jected to the CIA's plans for two extended overflights covering the re-
maining areas of Cuba not covered by the last two missions. Rusk
wanted peripheral flights over international waters kept separate from
(012958 1.61d1111>101010<25Yrs
181
Richard Lehman, "CIA Handling of the Soviet Buildup in Cuba, I July-16 October
1962." 14 November 1962 (Hereafter cited as Lehman Report). DCI records
l(TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.