Documents / FOIA release

CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys- tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …the following day, whithi next U-2 mission returned from the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 (18 Marcn n, CJJA rerar9 ITS Codeword). OSA History. chap. 4…
  • p. 142 …of the first series of U-2 missions as condu this research under a project codenamed…
  • p. 147 …not an easy task in crowded Japan.`) Detachment C began conducting missions in June 1957 after…
  • p. 191 …This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent with it, was sent to…
  • p. 196 …with Abel's "wife" (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI…
  • p. 204 …in-the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais- sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
199
Aftermath of the Bay of Pigs
invasion, 20 April 1961
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Refueling a U-2 in flight was a very delicate task. When fully
loaded with fuel, KC-135 tankers found it difficult to reduce airspeed
to-200 knots, the safest speed for refueling a U-2. As for the U-2s,
they were in a very vulnerable position when approaching a tanker at
200 knots because their frail wings could not stand much stress. As a
result, U-2 pilots had to approach the KC-135 tankers very carefully
in order to avoid the vortexes from the wingtips of the tanker and the
turbulence caused by the four large jet engines. During the first few
years of refueling operations, two U-2s crashed after their wings
broke off as they crossed into the turbulent area behind the tankers;
one of the pilots was killed!'
The in-flight refueling capability was a useful modification to
the U-2, but it could not dramatically extend mission length. The
main limiting factor remained pilot fatigue, which prevented missions
from lasting longer than approximately 10 hours.
U-2 Coverage During the Cuban Missile Crisis
Cuba remained a high-priority target even after the Bay of Pigs inva-
sion failed in April 1961. Soon afterward, Detachment G U-2s began
flying monthly missions over Cuba in a program known as Project
" Ibud.. p. 11-12 (TS Codeword).
ret
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.