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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 5
195
The loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 over the Soviet Union on 1
May 1960 marked the end of the aircraft's use over the Soviet Bloc.
Soon after the May Day incident, President Eisenhower ordered an
end to overflights. Similarly, his successor, John F. Kennedy, told a 25
January 1961 press conference, "I have ordered that the flights not be
resumed, which is a continuation of the order given by President
Eisenhower in May of last year." This was not a binding pledge, as
John A. McCone (who became DCI in November 1961) pointed out
to President Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, on 15 January
1964 in response to the new President's request for information on
U-2 overflight policies:
Contrary to popular assumption, President Kennedy did not
make any pledge or give an assurance, at least publicly, that
there would be no further overflights. He limited his response to
a statement that he had ordered that the flights not be resumed.
An order, obviously, is valid only until countermanded.'
Technically, McCone was correct, but no President was likely to
order a resumption of overflights of the Soviet Union without very
good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because
satellite photography gradually began to fill the gap left by the end of
U-2 coverage.
Although there were several proposals to resume overflights of
the Soviet Union in the years that followed, none reached the mission
planning stage. The Kennedy administration came closest to resuming
ED 129581.6(011>10<25Yrs
[S1
Memorandum for President Johnson from DC1 McCone, 'Response to Query
Concerning U-2 Overflight Policy," 15 January 1964. DCI records
TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.