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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
" Killian interview (S); Land interview (TS Codeword); Richard M. Bissell to John A.
McCone. 7 February 1962. DC! records S).
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Chapter 4
192
months as the Deputy Director for Plans, Bissell found himself in-
volved in a major struggle with Killian and Land, who were serving
on President Kennedy's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (succes-
sor to the Eisenhower administration's President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities). These two influential
Presidential advisers strongly advocated removing the Agency's over-
head reconnaissance programs from the DDP and placing them in a
new, science-oriented directorate, but Bissell resisted this proposal.
With his position in the Agency becoming increasingly untenable.
Bissell resigned on 17 February 1962, after turning down an offer
from the new DCI, John A. McCone, to become the CIA's first
Deputy Director for Research:6
Two days after Bissell's departure, the new Directorate came
into existence, and it absorbed all of the Development Projects
Division's special reconnaissance projects. Only conventional air sup-
port for the Clandestine Services remained with the DDP in the new
Special Operations Division. The U-2 program was no longer con-
nected with covert operations.
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The first half of 1962 was a confusing period for the
Development Projects Division. After losing the individual who had
created and supervised it for seven years, the DPD also lost its feeling
of autonomy when it was transferred from its own building to the new
CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward, Col. Stanley W. Beerli,
who had headed the DPD since 1960, returned to the Air Force. Then
on 30 July 1962, the overhead reconnaissance projects underwent a
major reorganization with the formation of the new Office of Special
Activities (OSA) to replace the DPD. The original organization of
OSA with 10 division or staff heads reporting directly to the director
of the office (at that time known as the Assistant Director for Special
Activities) proved too cumbersome, and, on 30 September 1962, a re-
organization divided most of these offices between two major
subordinates, the Deputy for Technology and the Deputy for Field
Activities (see chart, page 193). The Office of Special Activities
(OSA) continued to control reconnaissance activities and related re-
search and development after the Directorate of Research was en-
larged and renamed the Deputy Directorate for Science and
Technology (DDS&T) on 5 August 1963 (along with the other
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.