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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 4
189
denied areas, whether by photographic, ELINT. COMINT, infrared,
RADINT, or other means." The only exception to COMOR's area of
responsibility was "reconnaissance and aerial surveillance in direct
support of actively combatant forces." 5'
By this time the Air Force had developed a large overhead re-
connaissance program of its own, including a fleet of U-2s, and, occa-
sionally, there were conflicts between the areas of responsibility of
COMOR and the military services for collection requirements. The
Air Force had already won a major victory in 1958, when it claimed
that the White House had given responsibility for peripheral recon-
naissance of the Soviet Union to the military. DCI Dulles, who was
always reluctant to become involved in matters that seemed to lie in
the military's area of responsibility, did not resist this claim, and the
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee stopped preparing requirements for
peripheral flights. This ended a major requirements committee study,
which sought to estimate what could be gained from U-2 oblique pho-
tography along the entire border of the Soviet Union. 5 The last CIA
U-2 mission along the Soviet Union's coasts occurred on 22 June
.1958: thereafter, the only peripheral missions conducted by the CIA
were those along the Soviet Union':s
Until the spring of 1961, there was virtually no coordination of
military reconnaissance activities, even within the individual services.
Each commander of a Theater or a Unified and Specified Command
conducted his own independent reconnaissance activities. To meet the
growing need for overall coordination of these activities at the na-
tional level, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established the Joint
Reconnaissance Center (JRC) under the J-3 (Operations) of the Joint
Staff. The JRC immediately began to coordinate and obtain approval
for approximately 500 missions per month. assigning each a risk fac-
tor of Critical, Sensitive, Unique. or Routine. The JRC then prepared
a monthly Activities Book giving details of the proposed missions
and briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the more risky missions. The
CIA received a copy of the Activities Book.
" DOD 217, effective 9 August 1960 (S).
Memorandum for DCI McCone from James Q. Reber, Chairman. COMOR. "Proposed
Procedures for Approval of Critical Reconnaissance." 21 March 1962, COMIREX records
(TS Codesvord).
UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.