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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
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Chapter 4
188
became more formal as the National Security Council became
involved. Henceforth, proposed missions had to be submitted to the
National Security Council (NSC) Special Group for approval. In the
early 1960s, the Special Group consisted of the DCI, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State, and the Military
Adviser to the President. After the Military Adviser, Gen. Maxwell
Taylor, became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962, his
place on the Special Group was taken by McGeorge Bundy, the
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs:"
Before requesting permission from the Special Group for a U-2
mission over denied territory, the CIA prepared a detailed submission
giving justification for the proposed mission and maps showing the
targets to be photographed, flight times, and emergency landing sites.
Such submissions came to be known as "black books" because they
were placed in black, looseleaf binders. The decision of the Special
Group was generally final, althou g h on occasion controversial issues
were presented to the President for his decision.
This approval process did not come into play immediately after
May 1960 because there was a long pause in U-2 operations as the
detachments returned from overseas. It was not until late October
1960 that the next U-2 operation occurred, this time over Cuba. By
this time the full approval procedure had been established, and the
Special Group approved the mission (see chapter 5).
The approval process was not the only part of the U-2 program
that changed after May 1960. The process for establishing require-
ments for overhead reconnaissance missions also became more for-
mal. In August 1960 the US Intelli gence Board took over the Ad Hoc
Requirements Committee and merged it with the Satellite Intelligence
Requirements Committee to form the Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance. DCI Directive 2/7 tasked COMOR with the "coor-
dinated development of foreign intelligence requirements for
overhead-reconnaissance projects over denied areas." The DCID
defined "overhead reconnaissance" to include "all reconnaissance
for forei g n-intelligence purposes by satellite, or by any vehicle over
The Special Group, which had been created by NSC Intelligence Document 5412/2 in
1955 to oversee coven activities, was originally known as the 5412 Committee. Later the
Special Group became known as the 303 Committee and then the 40 Committee. United
States Congress, Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence. book I. (Washington,
DC: US Government Printin g Office, 1976). pp. 48-53.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.