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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 16 …An RB-29 lost in the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also…
  • p. 38 …off to about 6 percent of its sea-level thrust. Finally, low structural load factors, like…
  • p. 75 …with a boiling point of 300T at sea level. Manufacturing this special fuel required petroleum byproducts…
  • p. 80 …heavier and delivered only 10,200 pounds of thrust at sea level; the resulting --soarer UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 89 …that they could not be flown at sea level faster than 190 knots in smooth air…
  • p. 98 …southern Europe and then across the Black Sea and the desert areas of China. These bal…
  • p. 102 …working on a cover story for over- seas operations. It was important to have a plausible…
  • p. 120 …neanteagon • 724744 (8009071 4-92 Finland Baltic Sea ükranian Italy ROME IUMIS Tunisia Mediterranean Sea UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 139 …Soviet border from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and on to Afghanistan. The System…
  • p. 146 …aircraft made a run over the Black Sea. 'I here were a total of nine DB…
  • p. 148 …space launch taciitty east of the Aral Sea in Kazakhstan. None of the mission planners was…
  • p. 158 …it turned abruptly upward over the Bering Sea just west of Alaska, climbed to 110,000…
  • p. 166 …the Soviet border and over the Black Sea without entering Soviet airspace. In late August, as…
  • p. 215 …F"••• N. ' :\ ■ Caribbean Sea Ceyrnen Islands M FL) .r, Unttad ) ' ^ Gulf of Mexico NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN…
  • p. 216 …Isle of P,floo Caribbean Sea ••• Corn. Islands IWO Janss — 200 kilometers 100 200 Miles ".! SgsgalgOidaRte…
  • p. 217 SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 Caribbean Sea Gulf of Mexico NORTH A TLANTIC OCEAN 9…
  • p. 316 …Shortly before Leningrad, the A-12 would head west-southwest down the Baltic Sea, skirting the…
Chapter 4
185
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
The Prettyman Board's finding was based on a large body of evi-
dence indicating that Powers was telling the truth about the events of
I May 1960: the testimony of the experts who had debriefed Powers
after his return; a thorough investigation of Powers' background with
testimony by doctors, psychiatrists, former Air Force colleagues, and
his commander at Adana; Powers' own testimony before the board;
the results of a polygraph examination that he had volunteered to un-
dergo; and the evidence provided by photographs of the wreckage of
his aircraft, which Kelly Johnson had analyzed and found consistent
with Powers' story. Nevertheless, DCI McCone remained skeptical.
He asked the Air Force to convene its own panel of experts to check
Johnson's assessment of the photographs of the U-2. The Air Force
quickly complied, and the panel supported Johnson's findings.
McCone then seized upon the one piece of evidence that contradicted
Powers' testimony—a report by the National Security Agency (NSA)
that suggested that Powers may have descended to a lower altitude
and turned back in a broad curve toward Sverdlovsk before being
downed—and ordered the Prettyman Board to reconvene on I March
for another look at this evidence. The board remained unconvinced by
NSA's thin evidence and stuck to its original findings. A few days lat-
er, on 6 March 1962, Powers appeared before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, which commended his actions. The Senate
Forei g n Relations Committee also held brief hearings on the U-2
Affair, with DCI McCone representing the CIA.'"
Although all of these inquiries found Powers to have acted prop-
erly, they did not release many of their favorable findings to the pub-
lic, which had received a very negative image of Powers' behavior
from sensational press reports and statements by public figures who
were not aware of (or chose to ignore) the truth about Powers' actions
while in captivity. One member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator John J. Williams, expressed concern about the
impact of this silence on Powers' reputation in a question to DCI
McCone on 6 March 1962: "Don't you think he is being left with just
a little bit of a cloud hanging over him? If he did everything he is
supposed to do, why leave it hanging?" 41 Doubts about Powers did
remain in the public mind because he received no public recognition
for his efforts to withhold information from the Soviets. He was also
" Beschloss, Mayday. p. 352-354: Thomas Powers, Man Who Kept the Secrets, p. 328:
Prettyman Board. DCI records (S).
" United States Congress, Senate. Foreign Relations Committee, Executive Sessions of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. 12. 86th Congress. Second
Session. -Report on the U-2 Incident." 6 March 1962. p. 265 (declassified 1982).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.