Documents / FOIA release

CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
-Swere‘ALQEQIIL
Chapter 4
182
ED 129581.61d1111>1018<25Yrs
Japanese Government, faced with growing anti-American sentiment
and complaints in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on
Japanese territory, asked the United States to remove the U-2s. The
very next day the CIA closed Detachment C; its U-2s were disman-
tled and returned to the United States aboard C-124s.37
In the midst of the furor in Japan, on 1 July 1960, just six weeks
after the Paris Summit, Soviet fighter aircraft shot down an Air Force
RB-47 on an electronic intelligence collection mission over interna-
tional waters near the Soviet Union's Kola Peninsula. Two survivors
were captured. The Soviet Union claimed that the aircraft had vio-
lated its airspace, while the United States denounced the Soviets for
downing the plane over international waters. The acrimony exacer-
bated an already tense international atmosphere.8
One additional blow to the U-2 program came in the summer of
1960. NASA, concerned about the damage to its reputation from its
involvement in the U-2 affair and hoping to obtain international coop-
eration for its space program. decided to end its support of the cover
story that U-2s were conducting weather research under its auspices."
These developments resulted in a complete halt to all U-2 opera-
tions from overseas bases for more than six months. Pilots and air-
craft from Detachments B and C were consolidated into Detachment
G at Edwards Air Force Base, California,
1Detachment G now comprised eight pilots from
Detachment B and three pilots from Detachment C. Because Powers'
capture had compromised Project CHALICE, the Agency assigned a
new cryptonym to the U-2 effort; henceforth, it was called Project
IDEALIST.'
" OSA Chronology, p. 28 (TS Codeword)•
"Mystery of the R13-47," Newsweek. 25 July 1960, pp. 36-37; "Nikita and the RB-47,"
Time, 25 July 1960. pp. 30-31.
At a meeting of high-level CIA. NASA. and State Department officials on 31 May 1960,
NASA was willing to continue its association with U-2 flights for the time being. but the
Administrator of NASA, Dr. Keith Glennan, believed that his agency "would be well ad-
vised to disengage from the U-2 program as rapidly as possible." James A. Cunningham.
Memorandum for the Record, "Telephone Conversation with Dr. Hugh Dryden, Deputy
Director, NASA. - June 1960, DPD chrono 15 0. OSA records (S).
OSA History, chap. 12, pp. 47-49; chap. 16. p. 10 (TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.